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Among some of the more colorful groups on the American religious 
spectrum, the religious faith of believers seems to involve a willing­
ness to take substantial physical risks—risks to health, to physical 
functioning, even the risk of death. These groups include several in 
which the risks a believer takes are indirect (as in refusing blood 
transfusions or in refusing all medical treatment), and a few in which 
the risks are immediate and direct (for instance, in handling live poi­
sonous snakes). W e may think of these practices as extraordinary 
tests of religious commitment, or we may think of this willingness to 
risk death as a demonstration of the extraordinary value religious 
goals can have for believers. Indeed, willingness to risk death for reli­
gious reasons is often extolled as the highest test of faith. But I also 
think that the willingness of the members of religious groups to risk 
death reveals a set of disturbing moral issues, issues concerning the 
ways in which religious groups " bring it about” that their adherents 
are willing to take such risks. In what follows, I want to take a careful 
look at the influence of religious groups on their adherents’ choices, 
focusing on high-risk decision making which can result in death. To 
address these issues is not to suggest that a religious believer’s willing­
ness to risk death may not be sincere and devout, but rather to cast a 
morally skeptical eye on the way in which these sincere, devout beliefs 
are engendered by the religious institutions within which they arise.
Risk Budgets and Styles
Let us put the problem in a somewhat more precise way. To do so, we 
can conceptualize the problem as it would, be seen within the field of 
professional ethics; here, it would be treated under the general rubric 
of consent. This conceptualization will provide an approach to the 
problem, and will permit us to employ analytic techniques from both 
ordinary apparatus and professional ethics.
In everyday life, risks which a person voluntarily and knowingly 
takes can be described as the result of a prudential calculation on his 
part, however rudimentary that calculation may in practice be, in 
which he elects a course of action which he hopes will produce a gain 
or avoid a loss, though he also recognizes that it may either concur­
rently or alternatively result in a (further) loss. This prudential calcu­
lation involves a survey of the range of possible outcomes of the 
action considered, an assessment of the likelihood of these various 
possible outcomes (the decision is made "under risk” if these proba­
bilities are known, "under uncertainty” if they are not), and an
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assessment o f the relative desirability or undesirability o f each o f the 
possible outcomes. Typically, "avoidance” risk taking weighs two or 
more projected negative outcomes against each other; gain-oriented 
positive risk taking may weigh various positive outcomes, or a posi­
tive outcome against both the costs o f failing to achieve it and failing 
to take the risk. Whatever the specific context of the risk decision, 
the decision maker properly makes the calculation by multiplying the 
value o f each possible outcome times the probability that it will 
occur, if known, or the best approximation to it, and choosing that 
with the highest expected utility. That this calculation may be made in 
a completely intuitive, nonquantitative way does not obscure its 
nature: conscious decision making under risk or under uncertainty 
always involves acting so as to produce some preferred outcome des­
pite recognition that this action may instead produce a different,
Each individual, Charles Fried has pointed out, has a distinctive 
"risk budget”: this is the degree and severity o f risk he is willing to 
accept in order to avoid certain losses or achieve certain gains.1 This 
"risk budget” is a function, o f course, o f the possible courses of 
action the individual foresees, the probabilities he assigns to the var­
ious possible outcomes, and the utilities he attaches to each o f these, 
influenced by any characteristic errors he may make in performing the 
prudential calculation which indicates to him what course o f action 
promises the greatest expected utility. But while the risk budgets o f  
ordinary individuals in a culture appear to be fairly uniform with 
respect to the background risks o f everyday life (for example, in 
drinking the water in a given locality or in using electricity in one’s 
home), there is considerable divergence in the willingness o f individu­
als to accept specific higher foreground risks— for instance, in finan­
cial dealings or in high-risk sports like hang gliding or mountain 
climbing. This is just to say that some members o f a culture take risks
Furthermore, each individual has a distinctive "risk style”: this is 
the degree o f deliberation or abandon he exercises in making the pru­
dential calculation in which risk-taking consists. Some people size up 
perceived risks with meticulous, painstaking care, regardless o f  
whether the risks are mild or severe and the amount of information 
they have about the probabilities o f  various possible outcomes; others 
take both big and little risks in a quite cavalier way. Individuals also 
process relevant information in quite different ways: for instance, 
some are naturally optimistic, focusing primarily on the benefits to be 
gained; others are comparatively pessimistic, attending to the possible 
losses—even when their estimates o f the probabilities o f the outcomes 
are the same. In processing information, some individuals may be 
more prone to characteristic errors o f reasoning in risk-assessment 
than others. Like risk budgets, the risk styles o f persons within a cul­
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ture are relatively uniform with respect to background risks, but may 
vary considerably among individuals with respect to certain more 
conspicuous risks. This is just to add that some people make their 
choices about risks in ways that other people would reject.
Now the problem which the practices o f certain religious groups 
present arises with an observation about risk budgets and styles. W ith 
respect to both risk budgets and styles, we observe broad commonali­
ties among the members o f a culture with respect to background risks, 
and we also note a range o f idiosyncratic, individual risk budgets and 
styles with respect to certain conspicuous, higher-risk decisions. 
However, when we observe the risk budgets and styles o f the 
members o f certain religious groups, we notice striking uniformities 
not so much with respect to background risks, but with respect to 
major, conspicuous, foreground risks— direct risks to health, physical 
functioning, even to life. Specifically, what we notice is that the kinds 
o f risks characteristically taken by members o f these groups often fall 
well outside the risk budgets and in addition violate the risk styles of  
most other members o f society—even outside the quite broad range 
o f individual variation in risk budget and style which members o f the 
culture ordinarily display with respect to their decisions. To put the 
observation which introduces the problem in another way, we see that 
the members o f certain religious groups take risks other people don’t, 
and they decide to do so in ways other people wouldn’t, but they 
nevertheless do these things in remarkably uniform ways. Nor are 
these trivial risks; some are potentially fatal ones.
These characteristic risk-taking patterns, each distinctive o f  a differ­
ent group, may seem to be just another element in the colorful spec­
trum o f American religious diversity. But I think this colorful diver­
sity cloaks substantial moral issues about the way in which religious 
groups influence and shape individual decision making among their 
members. It is not just that these people take risks other people don’t 
and decide to do so in ways other people wouldn’t; it is the very uni­
formity o f these group-specific risk budgets and styles, and the degree 
to which they fall outside the ordinary range o f variation, that invites 
us to look at the mechanisms by which they are produced. What we 
can expect to find are systematic, doctrine-controlled violations o f the 
principle o f autonomy, that is, o f that moral principle familiar in pro­
fessional and in ordinary ethics which requires both protection for an 
individual’s capacity to choose and respect for the substance o f his 
choice, and we will be able to identify these violations by locating 
exactly the precise point at which they occur in the paradigmatic 
decision-making process.
W e shall look at these mechanisms by examining in some detail the 
practices o f four quite different religious groups whose adherents reg­
ularly make choices which indirectly or directly expose them to risks 
o f death. W e will do this in order to consider whether some o f the
ways in which religious groups shape and control high-risk decision­
making are morally indefensible, and I will argue that this is the case. 
However, I will also argue that this is not true of all o f the ways in 
which high-risk decision making is influenced—even among the four 
groups isolated for discussion here—and it will be part o f my project 
to develop a general criterion for distinguishing morally indefensible 
practices in shaping decision making in religion from those practices 
which may be morally defensible. This criterion will serve in concert 
with a typology o f doctrinal claims to be discussed briefly below to 
allow us to fix more precisely the range within which we can discern 
and address ethical issues generated within organized religion.
Three o f the groups we shall examine participate in practices which 
impose varying degrees of indirect risk of death by refusal o f medical 
treatment or some component of it—Christian Science, Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, and the Faith Assembly. The practices o f a fourth group 
impose in addition a direct threat o f death—the serpent-handling, 
strychinine-drinking groups within the Holiness Church. Two of  
these, the Faith Assembly and the Holiness Church, are generally 
regarded as cults or fringe groups; the other two, Christian Science 
and the Jehovah’s Witnesses, occupy intermediate positions some­
where between the fringe and the mainstream of American religious 
groups. That these are all Christian denominations should not suggest 
that similar moral issues do not arise in other world religions, but 
only that the issues of high-risk decision making in religious commit­
ment are particularly prominent ones in certain strands of the Chris­
tian tradition.
Risk Taking in Four American Religious Groups
1. Christian Science. The Church o f Christ, Scientist, takes the refusal 
of conventional medical treatment in favor o f Christian Science heal­
ing as central among its practices and as indicative o f faith.2 According 
to Christian Scientist belief, what we (mistakenly) call "disease” is 
produced by a "radically limited and distorted view of the true spirit­
ual nature and capacities of men and women”3; illness results from 
"human alienation from G od,”4 produced by fundamental misunder­
standing. Disease is symptomatic not o f physical disorder but o f  
underlying spiritual inadequacy and a failure to understand one’s true 
spiritual nature. W hen a faithful member o f the church falls ill, he or 
she consults a Christian Science practitioner to seek treatment which 
consists "entirely o f heartfelt yet disciplined prayer.”5 The practi­
tioner, who is often consulted by telephone (sometimes long-distance) 
and need not make a bedside visit, has no medical training in either 
diagnosis or treatment. The practitioner does not physically touch or 
examine the patient. Rather, the practitioner assists the ill person in 
prayer, the objective o f which is to relieve physical symptoms by
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promoting the correct and reverent understanding o f the true nature 
of disease— i.e., that in reality there is no such thing. Hence, prayer is 
believed to be incompatible with conventional medical treatment, 
sir\oe medical treatment presupposes the misleading assumption that 
there is such a thing as disease, that it is o f physical origin, and that it 
can be treated by physical means. Properly, one cannot speak o f  
"cure,” for there is no disease to be cured; rather, the relief o f symp­
toms is a "demonstration” o f the correctness o f the principles upon 
which Christian Science is founded. Scientists do generally use the 
services o f dentists and oculists, and sometimes have physicians per­
form such "mechanical” procedures as setting broken bones, but 
other than this no conventional medical procedures, either diagnostic 
or therapeutic, are used.6 For services rendered in praying for and 
with the individual who is ill, the Christian Scientist practitioner 
receives a fee, roughly comparable to the fees conventional physicians 
charge, which is reimbursable by many insurance companies (includ­
ing some Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans) and by some state and federal 
Medicare and Medicaid programs as well.7
Frequently, the choice between Christian Science healing and con­
ventional medical treatment does not constitute a subjectively recog­
nized risk for the devout Scientist, since belief in the efficacy o f Chris­
tian Science healing may be very strong. In these cases, the individual 
may be quite confident that Christian Science healing will provide 
relief from the condition which troubles him. Nevertheless, his choice 
to accept treatment from a Christian Scientist practitioner rather than 
an M.D., or to accept no treatment at all, resembles in structure any 
other prudential calculation under risk, where various possible 
outcomes—cure, continuing illness, incapacitation, or death—are 
foreseen under specific valuations and under more or less quantifiable 
expectations concerning the likelihood o f their occurrence. Christian 
Scientists are o f course aware o f the availability o f conventional medi­
cine, at least in part because so much o f Christian Science teaching 
involves warnings against resort to it. Thus, conventional medical 
treatntent is a possible choice, but one which, on prudential grounds, 
the believing Christian Scientist does not choose. This is because the 
believing Scientist not only thinks he is acting in accord with the dic­
tates or expectations o f his faith, but also thinks he will maximize the 
likelihood of achieving that possible outcome with the greatest 
expected utility—namely, successful cure— by preferring Christian 
Science healing to conventional medicine. It is in this choice that the 
risk-taking lies, though for the believing Christian Scientist, o f course, 
it will be seen as a good risk.
2. Jehovah’s Witnesses. Jehovah’s Witnesses refuse a single compo­
nent o f medical treatment, the transfusion o f blood or blood deriva­
tives into their own bodies. They do so on the basis o f a variety o f  
scriptural passages, especially Genesis 9:4 ("...you must not eat the
3 0  Margaret Pabst Battin
flesh with the life, which is the blood, still in it...”), Leviticus 17:12 
("...Therefore I have told the Israelites that neither you, nor any alien 
settled among you, shall eat blood...” ), Deuteronomy 12:23-25 ("...you  
must strictly refrain from eating the blood, because the blood is the 
life...” ), and Acts 15:28-29 ("...It is the decision o f the Holy Spirit, 
and our decision, to lay no further burden upon you beyond these 
essentials: you are to abstain from meat that has been offered to idols, 
from blood, from anything that has been strangled, and from fornica­
tion.” ); they believe that the scriptural prohibition o f eating or drink­
ing blood prohibits any form o f taking the blood of another into 
one’s own body, including by transfusion.8 Although they will accept 
infusion of nonblood solutions to expand blood volume, faithful 
Witnesses consent to surgery— even major surgery—only under the 
understanding that it be performed without additional blood.9 They 
will not accept blood in emergency situations or accidents, and rela­
tives are asked to refuse consent on behalf o f those who are uncons­
cious. Nor will they accept blood or blood derivatives in treatment 
for diseases of the blood, such as anemia or leukemia. In a series o f  
cases, the courts have generally upheld the right o f competent, adult 
Jehovah’s Witnesses to refuse blood transfusions, even where the risk 
of death is very high, provided that the patient has no obligations to 
dependents which cannot otherwise be met.10 However, the courts 
have generally not permitted pregnant women to refuse transfusions, 
nor parents to refuse transfusions for their minor children.
For Jehovah’s Witnesses, the situations in which these choices arise 
are comparatively rare, though when such situations do arise they may 
be extremely serious or life-threatening. Frequently, too, such deci­
sions must be made in conditions o f extreme urgency, as for accident 
victims, where exsanguination is an immediate, life-threatening risk. 
Despite the urgency, however, such choices also conform to the risk- 
taking paradigm: the two principal possible outcomes—survival with 
transfusion, vs. death without transfusion, are foreseen under evalua­
tions assigning great weight to obedience to church belief and the 
highest value to an expected salvific afterlife, versus a great but com­
paratively lesser value to continuing physical existence. These are 
avoidance choices in risk taking; it is not possible to avoid taking the 
risk. But as in all risk taking, that option believed to promise greater 
utility under the valuation assigned is the one which the prudent, 
rational Witness will choose.
3. The Faith Assembly. The Faith Assembly, a fundamentalist group 
of several thousand members centered in northeastern Indiana, pro­
hibits its members from consulting doctors or from using any medical 
treatment at all, including vaccination and other preventive treatment, 
assistance in childbirth, emergency treatment, prostheses, eyeglasses, 
or hearing aids. This group was founded in the mid-1960's by Hobart 
Freeman, a former Southern Baptist minister who had been dismissed
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from the faculty at a fundamentalist theological seminary for failing to 
conform to its beliefs. Freeman started the church in his basement, 
moved it to a rural barn (the "Glory Barn”), and after a dispute with 
the owner, moved the church again to its present location in W ilmot, 
Indiana. Freeman taught the members o f the fledgling church to shun 
doctors and rely on prayer and faith for healing, a teaching which stif­
fened into a rigorous anti-medical policy enforced with threatened 
expulsion from the group. Freeman also claimed that he would never 
die.
In the spring o f 1983, two reporters from the Fort Wayne News- 
Sentinel investigated evidence o f 52 deaths attributed to the group’s 
prohibition o f medical treatment.11 The dead included 28 babies 
whose mothers refused prenatal care, seven children with untreated 
illnesses and injuries, ten adults with untreated illnesses, and seven 
mothers with complications of childbirth. These reporters also identi­
fied a living five-year-old child with a basketball-sized tumor o f the 
abdomen whom they expected to become the 53rd. But they also 
found evidence that compliance with the group’s policy o f refusing 
medical treatment was by no means universally voluntary. They doc­
umented the existence o f an "underground” network via which moth­
ers were taking their children to physicians in neighboring cities, so 
that they could receive medical treatment without fear o f exposure, 
punishment, or excommunication for themselves or the children.
They also described in detail the case o f Sally Burkitt, a 27-year-old 
woman who hemorrhaged following the unassisted delivery o f a child: 
medical attention was denied her and she bled to death 56 hours after 
the delivery—despite her explicit, repeated pleas that a doctor be 
called. ("W e’ll get the best doctor there is,” her husband had prom­
ised, but what he meant was Jesus.)12 By late 1985, at least 90 deaths 
had been attributed to the practices o f the group, and by 1988 the 
figure had reached 100. Hobart Freeman had been indicted in connec­
tion with the death o f a 15-year-old girl, but in December o f 1984 he 
himself had died— with advanced heart disease, gangrene in one foot, 
pneumonia, and possible diabetes, having refused all treatment. Legis­
latures in the midwestern states with sizeable Faith Assembly popula­
tions began to enact a number of laws mandating medical care for 
children.13
4. The Holiness Churches. Serpent handling is a practice found in 
many cultures, including those o f certain southwest American Indian 
groups, but it is particularly widespread in the Appalachian regions o f  
the southeastern United States. It was apparently introduced in 1906  
in Grasshopper Valley, Tennessee, by a man named George W ent 
Hensley, who carried a rattlesnake in his hands down from a ridge 
where he had been bitten. Hensley evangelized throughout Appala­
chia; his legacy includes many o f the small, independent Holiness 
Churches found in this region. W hile not all Holiness Churches prac-
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tice serpent handling and while it is illegal under state law in Ken­
tucky, Virginia, and Tennessee and under municipal ordinances in 
North Carolina, the practice is nevertheless found in rural areas in 
much o f Appalachia.
Serpent handlers base their practices on a literal interpretation o f  
M ark  16:17-18:
And these signs shall follow them that believe: in my 
name shall they cast out devils; and shall speak with new 
tongues. They shall take up serpents; and if they drink any 
deadly thing, it shall not hurt them; they shall lay hands on 
the sick, and they shall recover.
At the Scrabble Creek Church o f All Nations (about 37 miles from 
Charleston, W est Virginia) prayer meetings are held in a small, one- 
room building with benches or pews and an open area at the front. 
The meeting is attended by members o f all ages, including infants and 
children, and sometimes by visitors as well. Meetings may last four to 
six hours, two or three times a week, and consist o f hymn singing, 
preaching, foot washing, healing, and personal testifying o f increasing 
emotional intensity. Participants dance, sing, shriek, shout, crouch or 
lie on the floor, and may exhibit glossolalia and motor automatisms 
including spasms, jerks, and seizures. At the climax o f these meetings, 
live poisonous snakes (usually rattlers or copperheads collected in the 
nearby mountains) are produced from a box or wicker basket and 
passed among those who wish to handle them. Some participants 
simply touch or hold the snakes, while others coil the snakes around 
their arms, heads, or throats.14 The purpose, participants say, is to 
"receive the Holy Ghost” or to "confirm the word of G od” in Mark 
16. Bites do occur, but although one source claims that George Hens­
ley said o f his forty-six years with the Dolley Pond Church that he’d 
been bitten four hundred times, "till I’m speckled all over like a gui­
nea hen,” 15 bites are not particularly frequent. Most members also 
refuse medical treatment if bitten, claiming that the bite provides a 
further test o f  G od’s will.
Many serpent handlers claim that "Pm afraid of snakes like any­
body else,”16 but that they lose this fear when they are "annointed” to 
handle snakes and enter an ecstatic condition. Said Sister Eunice Ball 
of Newport, Tennessee,
W hen the annointing’s on me, I’m not afraid o f the ser­
pents. Other times I’d run. I’ve taken up as many as six 
serpents at one time—five copperheads and a large rattler.
I’ve not ever been bitten. There’s something there that you 
know without a doubt that it won’t harm you. My hands 
don’t get stiff. I can move my hands, but the feeling’s still 
there.” 17
Serpent-handlers variously believe that they will not be bitten, or that 
if bitten they will not die, that recovery from snakebite is a miracle
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wrought by God, and that those snakebite deaths which do occur are 
signs wrought by God "to show the scoffers how dangerous it is to 
obey His commandments.” 18 Detractors’ claims that the snakes have 
been de-venomed, drugged, or otherwise deliberately rendered harm' 
less are clearly false, and naturalistic explanations such as that grasp­
ing snakes by their midsections produces cataplectic reactions in the 
snakes or that human body heat or motion disturbs their reflexes also 
seem inadequate.19 Between 1910 and 1977, there were approximately 
forty deaths from religious serpent handling and nonfatal bites num­
bered in the hundreds if not thousands.20 Some o f these groups, espe- 
dally in W est Virginia, also engage in the drinking o f strychnine 
(sometimes called a "salvation cocktail” ) from which fatalities are 
also reported.
Religious Risk and Freedom of Religion
O f course, to show that risk-taking conduct occurs in various forms 
and with various degrees o f potentially fatal risk in different religious 
groups is not yet to reach a normative conclusion; it cannot simply be 
assumed that risk taking is wrong, however extreme its consequences 
for the person who takes the risk. Quite the contrary, it is plausible to 
defend risk-taking conduct in religion under the general principle of 
autonomy, regarding religious choice as one among the kinds o f choi­
ces to which an individual is entitled by his right o f self­
determination. Indeed, since religious belief may be at the heart o f an 
individual’s identity and since action in concert with these beliefs may 
be central to the individual’s securing of his identity in the world, 
religious choice—even where it involves serious, potentially disabling 
or fatal risks— may seem to be particularly worthy of protection and 
respect. O f course, some religiously committed individuals may not 
perceive their behavior as involving risks, nor, for that matter, as 
involving any sort o f choice or decision at all. Indeed, it may be the 
most firmly committed who take themselves to have no options, in 
that they feel bound to do whatever God, or the specific religious 
group requires. Some may even believe that they cannot do otherwise, 
not only in a normative sense but in a metaphysical sense as well. 
Ultimately, they believe, God determines both what shall happen and 
how they shall act. Still others may recognize only a single antecedent 
choice—for instance, the choice "for Jesus” or "for G od”— but hold 
otherwise theodeterminist views. Nevertheless, many religious believ­
ers do recognize the distinction between subjective and objective risk, 
and even if they feel that their personal commitments oblige them to 
make certain choices rather than others, nevertheless recognize that in 
many sorts o f religiously relevant situations it would be possible for 
them to perform any one o f a variety o f alternative actions, each o f  
which would yield differently valued outcomes and incur different
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degrees o f risk. The principle o f autonomy defends all these varieties 
of high-risk choice in religion, at least where choices are voluntarily 
and knowingly made — that is, where the criteria o f informed consent 
are met — even when the outcome may be death.
A principal objection to the view that autonomous risk-taking con­
duct in religion should be respected, and the only one with legal 
standing, appeals to the harm principle by citing the social costs o f  
such behavior. Under this principle, risk-taking religious conduct may 
be morally condemned, as well as restricted or prohibited under law, 
where it imposes harms or substantial risk o f harms to other persons. 
For instance, emotional and financial costs for immediate family 
members or others dependent on a person may be severe if the risk 
that person takes eventuates badly. Whether a parent dies because he 
has undergone surgery without blood, or was fatally bitten in a 
serpent-handling prayer meeting, or died after refusing medical treat­
ment for a curable illness, the consequences for a dependent child, for 
instance, are the same. Some legal cases appear to restrict religious 
risk taking on grounds o f obligations to dependents, as in the Jehov­
ah’s W itnesses cases, though this remains a much-disputed issue.
Religious risk taking may also be restricted if the risk envelops not 
only the individual who voluntarily assumes it but bystanders or 
dependents as well. For instance, in Swann v. Pack, a 1975 case, the 
Tennessee Supreme Court outlawed serpent handling on the grounds 
that it constitutes a public nuisance. In this case, a prayer meeting o f  
the Holiness Church o f God in Jesus Name was described by the 
prosecution as involving the
...handling o f snakes in a crowded church sanctuary with 
virtually no safeguards, with children roaming around ,
unattended, and with the handlers so enraptured and 
entranced that they were in a virtual state o f hysteria...21 
though the defense presented further evidence to show that the snake 
handling was performed on a stage in front o f the audience and that 
the area was roped off with guards stationed at intervals to prevent 
any snakes from escaping. W hile laws explicitly prohibiting serpent 
handling have been passed in only a handful o f states, observers sug­
gest that in many other states such practices would most likely be 
construed as constituting a public nuisance.
The costs society must absorb for those who are injured, incapaci­
tated, or killed in religious risk taking may o f course be considerable. 
However, a general analysis which focuses on the social consequences 
o f religious practices must surely cut the other way: a great deal o f the 
behavior encouraged by religious groups is strongly risk-reductive, 
especially where nonviolent, continent lifestyles are required, and 
results in social savings rather than costs. Methodists and Mormons 
do not drink; Seventh-Day Adventists avoid food additives, stimu­
lants, and meat; Quakers do not go to war. Catholics, like those in
High Risk Religion 3 5
most Christian groups, are forbidden to commit suicide. The Amish 
avoid motor vehicles and power appliances and tools, and have a cor­
respondingly lower accident rate. Most Christian-based groups dis­
courage premarital and extramarital sexual activity and violent life­
styles, thus reducing the risks o f injury, pregnancy, and 
sexually-transmitted disease. Where these prohibitions are effective, 
they lower risks to health and life considerably, and clearly vastly 
outweigh the social costs o f increased risk taking by those who refuse 
medical treatment and the handful o f snakehandlers in rural Appala­
chia. O f course, appeal to the harm principle introduces the extremely 
interesting question o f whether a religious group ought to encourage 
or require its members to consider the potential impact o f their own 
risk taking on other persons prior to their taking such risks, and if so, 
just how this impact ought to weigh in their choices, but this question 
is subsidiary to the more central moral issue to be explored here. This 
more fundamental issue directly concerns the ways in which members 
of religious groups come to take risks like these in the first place.
In assessing the ways in which our four specimen groups, Christian 
Science, Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Faith Assembly, and the Holiness 
Church, elicit risk-taking behavior, we are assuming that their practi­
ces do in fact increase the risks o f ill health, disability, or death. Reli­
able figures on the actual rates o f risk or on the frequency o f negative 
outcomes is available for none o f them, however, and for some of  
these groups information which might help to establish precise 
assessments o f increased risk is either not collected or very closely 
guarded. O f course, there are some scattered data on which to base 
our assumption. As we’ve seen, by 1988 a hundred deaths had been 
attributed to the practices o f the Faith Assembly in its two decades o f  
existence. A joint study by the Indiana State Department o f Health 
and the Center for Disease Control in Atlanta calculated that in Elk­
hart and Koscuisko counties, Indiana, where many Faith Assembly 
members live, mothers in the sect were 100 times as likely to die from 
complications o f pregnancy as other women in Indiana, and babies up 
to one year old three times more likely to die.22 About 40 deaths, we 
saw, had been reported by 1977 among snake handling groups. The 
coroner o f King County, Washington, did a retrospective analysis o f 
deaths o f children in the years 1935-1955, and found 11 deaths 
where 1) there was no medical treatment; 2) the child could have 
been positively treated and almost certainly would not have died; and 
3) the parents were Christian Scientists23; in this county, the average 
longevity o f  Christian Scientists was very slightly lower than the aver­
age longevity o f the non-Scientist population.24 Case-by-case data on 
deaths o f children in religious groups which reject conventional medi­
cal treatment is available from CHILD, Inc.25 However, rigorous sta­
tistical analyses o f morbidity and mortality patterns are in general not 
available for any o f these groups.
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The few figures which are available are altogether inadequate to 
establish reliable estimates o f the increase (or perhaps decrease) of  
risk in these religious behaviors* N o figures are available, for instance, 
on the number o f Jehovah’s W itnesses who have died as a result o f  
refusing blood transfusions, though certain individual cases can be 
documented from court or medical records. On the contrary, Jehov­
ah’s W itnesses often claim that surgery without blood, or with only 
nonblood volume expanders, may offer equal or better results than 
surgery with blood transfusions, partly because o f the risks o f disease 
transmission in transfusion and partly because o f the greater degree of 
surgical caution and skill employed by the surgeon who must operate 
without resorting to blood.26 Nevertheless, it is believed that many 
W itnesses are denied surgical treatment by surgeons not willing to 
assume the risks o f operating without blood. For instance, it was 
rumored some years ago that one o f the busiest trauma hospitals in 
Dade County, Florida, had a blanket policy o f refusing to treat W it­
nesses,27 although accurate figures are not available. As surgical tech­
niques improve for operating without blood and as recognition for 
W itnesses’ firmly established legal right to refuse blood becomes 
more widespread, however, the risks for W itnesses may be declining, 
though they still remain higher than for persons receiving competently 
performed surgery with blood where needed. (In fact, the use o f 
transfusion is no longer virtually automatic in major surgery even 
where religious belief is not an issue, and some attribute this to better 
surgical and laser techniques, as well as volume expanders, developed 
in response to the dilemmas which operating on Jehovah’s Witnesses 
had presented for surgeons.) Similarly, there has been no controlled 
study o f the morbidity and mortality o f Christian Scientists compared 
with persons accepting conventional medical care. That their religious 
practices increase the risks o f ill health or death would o f course be 
heavily disputed by Christian Scientists, and perhaps by the Faith 
Assembly and Holiness Church as well. Nevertheless, given the 
absence o f persuasive evidence to the contrary and the presence o f  
good reason to think that the risks are in fact substantially elevated in 
all these groups, we shall continue to assume so here.
Altering Risk Behavior
That the members o f these four religious groups exhibit distinctive 
commonalities in risk budget and style which fall well outside the risk 
budgets and styles o f most other persons in society is evident enough; 
but these commonalities do not all arise in the same way. Indeed, if 
we examine practices and policies o f these four groups more closely, 
we shall see that they exhibit four quite different mechanisms by 
which these commonalities are produced, each o f which involves 
autonomy-compromising interference with the paradigmatic decision­
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making structure at a different point. It is the differing nature of these 
interferences that renders the practices o f each of these groups subject 
to a different point o f moral critique, and that, in the end, will allow 
us to distinguish between those sorts o f interferences which are mor­
ally defensible and those which are not. In the actual world o f reli­
gious practice, o f course, none o f the mechanisms ascribed to each of  
these groups occurs in isolated form, and each o f the groups has some 
of the features o f the others (as do many other religious groups 
besides these four). But the mechanisms which we shall somewhat 
artificially isolate here are clearly those most prominent within and 
distinctive of these groups.
1. Coercion. One way in which a religious group (or any group, for 
that matter) can alter the risk-taking behavior of its members is by 
coercion. W ithin the Faith Assembly, for instance, although some 
members voluntarily accept its policy of refusing medical treatment, 
others— if we may believe the accounts o f the two Fort Wayne news­
paper reporters—do so only under threat o f other sanctions. These 
include public humiliation, repudiation by spouses, friends, and other 
members of the group, and expulsion from the group altogether. 
Coercion operates by introducing a new outcome variable into the 
calculation that the risktaker makes. Not only must the risktaker 
weigh the probabilities and costs or benefits o f possible negative or 
positive outcomes, but also a very large cost which will be imposed if 
he refuses to take the risk at all. It thus in effect suppresses the possi­
bility o f the initial choice. The force of the coercive measure is a func­
tion of the perceived costs to be imposed and the likelihood that it 
will actually be imposed, weighed against the costs and benefits o f the 
risk itself. However, such sanctions are typically viewed as virtually 
certain to be imposed—especially those which involve not only insti­
tutional discipline but humiliation and rejection within the group. A 
number o f religious groups, especially among the cults and new reli­
gions, are said to use coercion in securing compliance with fasting, 
socialization, and work regimens, expressions of loyalty and group 
commitment, and contribution o f one’s financial and other resources 
to the group: the Oakland Family o f the Unification Church and the 
Hare Krishna are often cited in this regard, and Jonestown is said to 
provide the most horrifying example. W ithin the Faith Assembly, 
these sanctions are comparatively mild, but still strong enough to 
produce compliance in many cases where the risks apparently would 
not have been voluntarily sustained.
2. Altering Risk Styles. A  second way in which a religious group can 
alter the risk-taking conduct o f its members is by altering the risk 
styles they employ. For instance, a group may work to make its 
members consider certain choices more carefully than they ordinarily 
might, often to the individual’s ultimate advantage. This, for example, 
may be the effect o f a good deal of the pastoral marriage counseling
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that many mainstream and other religious groups provide: counseling 
encourages the individual not to leave a marriage impetuously or in 
temporary anger, but only after sustained reflection, thought, and 
prayer. However, some religiously induced changes in risk style 
appear to work in the other direction, towards less considered, less 
cautious styles o f taking risks, and it is these which present deeper 
moral issues.
Among serpent-handling groups, for instance, individual choices to 
touch or hold a snake appear not to be coerced; there is no sanction, 
either official or informal, during the service or afterwards for declin­
ing to handle snakes. Nor are snakes thrust upon people; those who 
choose to handle them must come forward to do so. Many members 
of the Holiness Church attend prayer meetings on a regular basis but 
never handle snakes. In fact, the teachings and traditions o f this group 
explicitly encourage members to handle snakes only when they feel 
called or moved—i.e., "annointed”—to do so, and urge them not to 
do so otherwise. Persons are not blamed or chastised for failing to 
become annointed or for not handling snakes. Thus, serpent handling 
in the Holiness Church appears to be free of the kind o f coercion 
characteristic o f Faith Assembly refusal o f medical treatment.
However, serpent-handling meetings involve a very high degree o f  
participation by the members present. Services consist not only in 
singing and preaching, but in moving about the room, touching, 
shouting, and shrieking; this very high level o f activity is sustained 
over a number o f hours. These factors tend to produce an extremely 
heightened level o f emotionality, which in turn invites the trembling, 
tactile hallucinations, glossolalia, and physical convulsions which 
members believe are the identifying signs o f becoming "annointed” to 
handle snakes. But, according to the teachings and practices o f this 
group, it is in precisely this (abnormal) condition that an individual’s 
choice to handle serpents on this specific occasion must be made. One 
cannot decide in advance to handle snakes; one must wait to be 
"called.” Reverend Robert Grooms described his first annointing, 
which occurred at the Holiness Church o f God in Jesus Name, Carson 
Springs, Tennessee, in 1970, in the following way:
It was like a bucket o f water pouring over me. I was tin­
gling all over. I was so anointed with the power that I was 
just shouting....It’s sort o f like feeling the heat from a light 
bulb. It’s tremendous. It came over me in such a fantastic 
way. I felt it through my whole body. I just went plumb 
out in under the power. But I knew exactly what it was for.
God was telling me to take up the serpent.28 
This is the condition which the prosecution in Swann v. Pack called 
"so enraptured and entranced” that worshippers in it can be des­
cribed as in a "virtual state o f hysteria.” It is in this agitated condi­
tion, then, that the risk of sudden death is undertaken.
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W hile it is easy to point out the moral deficiencies o f coercive 
alterations o f risk budgets or styles, alterations brought about by pro­
ducing heightened emotionality may be somewhat harder to assess. 
Under the principle o f autonomy, recognized by both ordinary moral­
ity and professional ethics, self-harming choices ought not be honored 
where emotionality is heightened, at least not if it is heightened 
enough to impair the capacity for autonomous choice, and paternalis­
tic intervention may be necessary to protect autonomy where the 
individual’s decision-making capacity is impaired. Nevertheless, we do 
in practice respect many sorts o f risk-taking decisions made in emo­
tionally heightened conditions, for instance, those made in love, in 
patriotic fervor, in moments o f altruistic self-sacrifice, in "gutsy” 
sports adventures, in emergency rescues, and so on. Thus, we have 
rather ambivalent antecedent standards for impairment in risk-taking 
choices. It is not properly the actual risk involved in serpent handling 
that should arouse our moral suspicion (especially since the risk of  
death from snakebite may not be greater than in certain dangerous 
sports, such as hang gliding), but rather the way in which these groups 
engender a highly charged emotional climate and then require that 
risk-taking choices be made in this impaired condition.
O f course, the antecedent choice to attend a serpent-handling 
prayer meeting is not made under the same conditions, and thus is not 
subject to the same ethical reservations. However, participants claim 
that they do not know in advance whether they will in fact be 
annointed to handle snakes at a given meeting; they do not decide in 
advance to handle snakes, but rather simply to attend the meeting. O f 
course, to decide to attend the meeting is to decide to expose oneself 
to the risk of deciding to take the risk, but it is not a decision made in 
confrontation with the snakes or in the volatile surroundings o f the 
prayer meeting. The specific decision to handle snakes is not made 
during any earlier, calmer, or presumably more rational moments— 
namely, those moments o f which serpent handlers say "I’m afraid of  
snakes like anybody else,” but only at the meeting under the extraor­
dinary conditions which occur there.
3. Altering Risk Budgets. Even where the risktaker’s prudential calcu­
lation is neither skewed by the imposition of coercively large costs for 
failing to take the risk nor is made in an emotionally heightened con­
dition, there are still two important respects in which this calculation 
can be distorted. Like any group or individual, a religious group can
1) influence the individual’s estimates o f the probabilities of the var­
ious outcomes he foresees, or 2) change the evaluations he assigns to 
these outcomes, or perhaps both. In both cases, the effect of the 
influence is not to coerce choice or to impair its quality by altering 
risk style, but to alter the individual’s risk budget.
a. Altering assessments of probabilities. A  person reasonably conver­
sant with the circumstances o f  the world knows certain facts about it:
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that malnourishment impairs health, that rattlesnakes are poisonous, 
that acute appendicitis can be fatal, and so on. These commonplaces 
are as familiar to the religious person as to the nonreligious; they are 
part o f the common stock o f background information shared within a 
culture. Hence, the religious risktaker—at least where the risks are 
understood to be common, physical ones—will have a fair amount o f  
background knowledge about the risks he takes. A serpent handler 
knows that rattlesnake bites can be fatal; that is what makes snake- 
handling important, and why it serves as a test o f faith.29 Similarly, 
Faith Assembly members know that hemorrhage in childbirth can be 
fatal; that is why it is a test o f commitment to the church's beliefs to 
refuse treatment, and why Sally Burkitt pleaded for a doctor instead. 
O f course, in many cases religious risktakers will not know the precise 
degree o f risk involved— as, indeed, most o f us do not know the pre­
cise degree of risk from hemorrhage in childbirth or from untreated 
rattlesnake bites— but we all share some general conception o f the rel­
ative dangers o f these threats. It is against this background conception 
of general estimates o f danger that religious risk taking occurs.
Yet it is possible to change an individual’s estimate o f the likelihood 
that various possible outcomes will occur. Given an array o f evaluated 
possible outcomes, this may involve making specific positively-valued 
outcomes seem more likely, or making specific negatively-valued ones 
seem less likely, or both, so that a recalculation o f the risk would 
result in a different choice.
Take, for instance, the case o f the Christian Scientist with acute 
appendicitis who seeks relief from this condition. Like other members 
o f contemporary society, he will have some background conception o f  
the likelihood that untreated appendicitis could result in death, and 
while this is by no means a scientifically rigorous conception, he will 
still be able to say, for example, that the likelihood o f death is greater 
in untreated appendicitis than in, say, untreated influenza. However, 
the teachings o f his church persuade him that although this back­
ground information is accepted by nonbelievers and correctly des­
cribes the probabilities confronting them, the probabilities are quite 
different for persons who understand the nonphysical nature o f  
illness, the power o f Christian Science healing, and the true nature o f  
prayer. The believer holds that achieving a correct understanding o f  
illness as resulting from defective mental attitudes will free him from 
illness—even when the risks would otherwise be very high—and that 
the way to achieve this correct understanding is in prayer. Thus, the 
Christian Scientist will hold, the risk o f death from acute appendicitis 
treated only with Christian Science prayer is in fact much lower than 
the shared cultural conception insists. Indeed, he holds, it is lower not 
only than the risk from appendicitis not treated at all, but lower than 
the risk in appendicitis treated with conventional medicine. Prayer, in
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his view, is the most effective treatment of all. This shared perception 
of risk explains why members o f this religious group exhibit similar 
though unusual risk budgets in medical choices of this sort; but it also 
invites us to ask how this shared perception of risk is attained.
How does the believing Christian Scientist reach this still lower 
estimate o f the probability of death? Let us look at the kind o f evi­
dence with which he is supplied, and upon which he bases his calcula­
tions o f risk.
Support for claims of the efficacy of Christian Science healing, fol­
lowing the pattern of the assertions made in Science and Health W ith a 
Key to the Scriptures and other writings of Mary Baker Eddy, is pro­
vided largely by testimonials o f those who recount the ways in which 
they have been healed from diseases or injuries they have suffered. 
These testimonials are typically quite detailed and fervently sincere in 
tone; they are direct, first-hand accounts of what is often an extremely 
powerful, faith-confirming experience. For example, a woman living 
in the Mojave Desert area of California writes:
On a warm afternoon last May while coming into our 
house through the laundry room (which is part of the gar­
age), I felt a sharp pain in my right foot. Looking down, I 
saw what appeared to be a rattlesnake, disappearing under 
the washing machine...30 
She goes on to recount her fear, the assistance of the Christian 
Science practitioner in praying for her recovery, the development and 
eventual subsiding of a discolored, numb swelling on her foot, and the 
confirming effects this experience had upon her faith.
This homey testimonial is quite typical of the half-dozen to dozen 
published in each issue of the Christian Science Journal, a periodical 
widely circulated among Christian Scientists and a primary source of  
information about the church. The Journal asserts that "the statements 
made in these testimonies with regard to healings have been carefully 
verified,”31 and that it retains on file the originals of testimonies 
together with the three written verifications or vouchers required for 
publication. Since the turn of the century, approximately 50,000 tes­
timonials of healing have been published in the periodicals of the 
church; these are said to be "the most important body o f evidence 
concerning Christian Science healing...”32
According to a First Church o f Christ, Scientist authority defending 
healing in a recent issue o f The New England Journal of Medicine, care­
ful examination o f testimonials published in Christian Science period­
icals between 1971 and 1981 shows "647 testimonies concerning 
illnesses that had been medically diagnosed, in some cases both before 
and after a healing,” including "leukemia and other neoplasias, both 
malignant and benign; diptheria; gallstones; pernicious anemia; club 
feet; spinal meningitis; and bone fracture, among numerous others.”33 
This figure includes 137 pediatric cases. Healing in cases of these sorts
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might seem to constitute an impressive record. But we must notice 
that it is wholly anecdotal in form, appealing simply to isolated cases 
without reference to general patterns or trends, or to comparisons 
based on control groups. If we look at the effect o f this kind of 
information— independently o f whether the claims are actually true— 
we see that it exacerbates what is one o f the most common, frequent 
errors in decision making under risk.
Many kinds o f error are possible in risk-taking choice. Objective 
errors include misidentification o f the range o f possible outcomes and 
assignment o f faulty probabilities to possible outcomes (often as the 
product o f subjective factors like unwarranted optimism or pessim­
ism), misidentification o f the values one assigns to possible outcomes, 
inconsistent weightings o f possible outcomes, self-deception, and so 
on. But there is a common, documentable error characteristic of 
rational choice, especially vigorously discussed with reference to 
informed consent in medical situations. This is the tendency to over­
rely on case information and under-rely on base rate information.34 
Ordinary patients in ordinary medical contexts do this: they tend to 
base decisions on anecdotal accounts, supplied by physicians, friends, 
personal experience, or other sources, and downplay or ignore infor­
mation about the rates o f incidence of specific conditions, side effects, 
self-limiting conditions, spontaneous recovery, and so on. But while 
ordinary medical patients do this rather naturally, Christian Scientists 
in situations o f  medical risk are in effect encouraged to do it, since 
they are supplied with information that makes this miscalculation 
inevitable. W hat is not available from the Christian Science church or 
from its publications is any data that might counteract this tendency 
or contribute to establishing reliable base rate information: how often, 
given a specific medical condition, does Christian Science healing 
appear to be effective? This is a much easier question to answer than 
"How often is Christian Science healing actually effective?” But even 
for the easier question about apparent results no data is available. 
Clearly, 647 documented cases over a ten-year period is quite sparse 
evidence, in view of the number o f Scientists and the frequency 
within the general population o f these diseases. There might of course 
be many undiagnosed, undocumented cases, or a lower incidence o f  
such conditions among the Christian Scientist population, but these 
conjectures do little to provide the Christian Scientist with a reliable 
sense o f the frequency with which Christian Science healing, once 
attempted, is effective. Testimonials o f failures are, o f course, not 
published in the church’s periodicals. Furthermore, lack o f this 
information is compounded by acceptance o f a vast number of what 
we might call false positives—cases in which Christian Science healing 
is credited with the cure o f a condition that was self-limiting or would 
have resolved spontaneously anyway—as when the cold that vanishes 
after troubling a person for two weeks is taken as proof that Christian
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Science really works.35 Even the account by the woman bitten by the 
rattlesnake under her washing machine should be seen in light o f the 
fact that rattlesnake bites, especially at distant sites on a limb (the 
woman was bitten on the foot), are comparatively seldom fatal; but 
this information was not, o f course, provided. Yet it is only with ade­
quate base-rate information, making it possible to calculate overall 
frequencies o f success and failure in non-self-limiting conditions with 
given forms o f treatment, that a person can rationally compare con­
ventional medical treatment with Christian Science healing o f the 
same condition, and make his choice in an informed way.36
To assert that Christian Science healing cannot be chosen on a 
rational basis is o f course not to assume that Christian Science healing 
is in fact less effective than conventional medical therapy (a point 
possibly conceded by some opponents o f the group, given substantial 
rates o f iatrogenic illness in conventional treatment and the further 
fact that a very large proportion o f the "illness” initially seen by phy­
sicians is either self-limiting or psychogenic in origin), but only to 
point out that the basis on which the Christian Scientist makes his 
choice in seeking relief from his symptoms is not rationally defensi­
ble. Christian Science healing might in fact be more effective than 
conventional medicine, but even the Christian Scientist would have 
no way of knowing this. Yet the church does claim to supply persua­
sive, empirical evidence for the efficacy of healing; this is part of the 
point o f Science and Health W ith A  Key to the Scriptures, and part o f the 
point o f providing testimonials at all.
Nicholas Rescher takes the crucial distinction in risk assessment to 
be that between realistic and unrealistic appraisal.37 But despite the fact 
that the individual Christian Scientist’s choice to rely on Christian 
Science healing is not rationally defensible, it cannot be said to be 
unrealistic in a general sense. This is because the individual Scientist 
has not exaggerated, underestimated, misinterpreted, or otherwise 
misapprehended or distorted the evidence available to him. Given the 
sort o f evidence he has, the tools he is given for assessing it, and the 
surrounding claim of the institution in which he trusts that this evi­
dence is compelling, he makes a subjectively realistic assessment; the 
fault is not his, given his antecedent status as a believer. In fact, the 
Christian Scientist characteristically believes that he is making a good, 
sound decision, based on a large body o f compelling evidence— 
evidence which, though ignored by non-Scientists, is rationally per­
suasive. As one Scientist wrote,
My own family has relied on Christian Science for gen­
erations. I have never considered prayer a gamble. Please 
understand: I’m not speaking o f some crude kind o f "faith 
healing” that implores God to heal and says it was His will 
if nothing happens. I’m speaking o f responsible spiritual 
healing practiced now over a century by many perfectly
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normal citizens and caring parents.
I’m concerned about not being taken seriously— that ■ < < 
nobody in the media...is really taking into account that 
these healings have been happening over many years. Not 
just in my family, not just my friends. I’m speaking of the 
massive, long-term experience in a whole denomination.38 
If this believer’s assessment o f risk is objectively unrealistic, any 
moral complaint must be directed not primarily against the believer, 
nor against church teachers and officials, since after all they too share 
the same set o f assumptions as members o f the church. Rather blame 
should be directed primarily against the institutional perpetration of 
the claim, in the guise o f belief, that this evidence is good, and the 
complaint should point out the way in which this compromises the 
possibility o f autonomous choice. O f course, there is fault on both 
sides o f the fence: the medical establishment has been for the most 
part as uninterested in examining alleged Christian Science healings 
(being generally content to assert that either they must be spontane­
ous recoveries, perhaps associated with the placebo effect, or have 
been inaccurately diagnosed in the first place) as Christian Science has 
been to provide well-documented evidence for them, especially evi­
dence scrutinized under contrary hypotheses.
But there is a further complexity to the risks Christian Scientists 
take in choosing healing over conventional medical treatment. Not all 
healing is successful; some people remain incapacitated, some are sent 
to Christian Science sanitariums or nursing homes, and some die. 
Christian Science teaching explains this at least in part as the result o f  
a failure on the part o f the patient to understand fully his own nature 
as a spiritual being or to pray adequately for release from his incorrect 
attitudes; the devout Scientist believes that the risk o f death from dis­
ease correctly understood and adequately prayed for is nil. But what 
the Scientist, devout or otherwise, is not encouraged to assess in mak­
ing his own risk-taking choices is how likely it is that he will actually 
correctly understand and adequately pray for release from his condi­
tion. This crucially relevant factor in a prudential risk calculation 
under these religious assumptions is simply not brought into question 
or discussed, nor is any evidence bearing on it, anecdotal or other­
wise, provided. Just how often does the explanation o f a patient’s fail­
ure to recover appeal to the claim that the patient failed to pray 
appropriately or had the wrong attitude?—this information too is o f  
greatest relevance in risk-taking choices, yet nowhere forthcoming.
Furthermore, although there is some lack of agreement on this 
issue39, Christian Science appears to hold that healing through prayer 
is incompatible with conventional medical treatment, since prayer 
consists in achieving an understanding o f the nature o f disease which 
contradicts the causal, physicalist assumptions o f medicine. Stories 
abound of people being denied continuation of the services o f a
Christian Science practitioner if they enter the care o f a physician.40 
Patients who enter Christian Science nursing homes are required to 
sign a statement saying they will not seek the services of a physician.41 
Thus, although conventional physicians are quick to recognize the 
psychotherapeutic value of ordinary prayer by the patient, whatever 
advantages might accrue to the ordinary patient from a combination 
of medical treatment and religiously supported hope are not available 
to the Christian Scientist. Rather, the Scientist is forced to make a 
choice between therapies; yet he is not supplied with any evidence 
concerning whether the chances o f survival for those who accept both 
kinds o f therapy is better or worse than for those who rely solely on 
one or the other. Christian Science periodicals do not print testimon­
ials from persons who see doctors as well as healers, any more than 
they do from persons who see doctors alone.
Altering persons’ risk budgets by supporting claims recommending 
nonconventional treatment with anecdotal information unaccompan­
ied by base-rate data, as Christian Science does, and by ignoring the 
incidence of failed cases and o f any special conditions which must 
obtain for the supposed course o f action to be effective, fails to satisfy 
the third of the basic initial criteria for autonomous choice: not only 
must it be voluntary and rationally unimpaired, but it must be ade­
quately informed. It is true that anecdotal information o f the kind 
provided in Christian Science periodicals can be extremely effective in 
stirring faith and may be o f great significance in a person’s life. It may 
well produce a sizeable placebo effect. And it is o f course possible that 
Christian Science healing is in fact efficacious, even in non-self- 
limiting, serious illness. But insofar as merely anecdotal information is 
put forward as the evidence for claims o f efficacy in healing and as a 
basis for refusing conventional medical treatment, it is clearly an 
inadequate basis upon which to encourage people to take such sub­
stantial risks. Their consent to reliance on religious healing is not 
"informed,” nor is their refusal o f conventional medical treatment 
informed either. In assessing the character of Church policies which 
perpetuate this state of affairs, we shall be tempted to say that they 
involve deceit.
The analysis given here of evidentiary claims concerning the efficacy 
of nonmedical healing applies not just to Christian Science alone, but 
to any religious group which appeals to alternative varieties of healing, 
whether it involves denominational practitioners, faith healers, or the 
assumed direct influence o f a divine being. The Faith Assembly, for 
instance, regards Jesus as the sole physician, but at least if the scant 
evidence available concerning this group is correct, relies on much the 
same persuasive structures (where it does not directly coerce) to pro­
duce acceptance of this claim. So do individual faith healers of various 
sorts, groups such as the Church o f the First Born and the Faith 
Tabernacle Congregation, and many of the contemporary "televange­
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list” preachers. One might also want to inquire into the way in which 
beliefs about the efficacy o f healing are furthered at such institutions 
as the Roman Catholic shrine at Lourdes, as well as into the practices 
of groups which accept faith healing but do not reject conventional 
medical treatment, such as the Assembly o f God and certain sub­
groups o f Catholicism and Episcopalianism. Thus, white Christian 
Science may provide the most conspicuous example of a certain sort 
of religious intervention in high-risk decision making, it will have 
many features in common with other groups, and ethical censure, if it 
is appropriate at all, ought hardly be reserved for this group alone.
b. Altering evaluations of outcomes. In addition to altering assess­
ments o f probabilities, risk budgets can be altered by changing the 
evaluations that the risktaker assigns to various possible outcomes. 
Since the prudential calculation the risktaker makes is the product o f  
his assessments of the probabilities o f the various outcomes times the 
value he assigns to them, changing evaluations will alter risk behavior 
as effectively as altering estimates of probabilities.
Jehovah’s Witnesses, who refuse blood transfusions although they 
accept other components o f medical treatment, accept a risk o f death 
which is as serious as that taken by serpent handlers, Christian Scien­
tists, and members o f the Faith Assembly. However, the prudential 
calculation which the Jehovah’s W itness makes has quite different 
ingredients. Whereas the Christian Scientist seeks a cure for his illness 
(though he does not call it a "cure” nor recognize his condition as an 
"illness” ) and makes his decision whether to accept conventional 
medical treatment or to rely on Christian Science healing based on a 
calculation concerning the efficacy of the two forms o f treatment, 
however ill-informed it may be, the Jehovah’s Witness, in contrast, 
does not seek a cure at all. To be sure, he hopes to get well, and hopes 
not to die. But his primary commitment is to honor a prohibition he 
believes to be divinely mandated, whatever the costs to him in health 
or life, in order to ensure his own eventual salvation. O f course, the 
Jehovah’s Witness will be party to the culturally shared background 
information concerning the likelihood of death in whatever medical 
condition he is suffering, whether it is acute appendicitis or intestinal 
hemorrhage, but his church makes no attempt to alter his assessments 
of these probabilities. W hat the church does instead is supply him 
with a reevaluation o f outcome states.
The Jehovah’s W itness suffering an intestinal hemorrhage, for 
instance, will have at least a general awareness (sometimes intensified 
by an unsympathetic surgeon) that the chances of surviving with both 
surgery and blood transfusion are good, but that the chances of sur­
viving with surgery alone, without blood, are markedly reduced, 
though they are not so low as the chances o f surviving without any 
treatment at all. His church does not disguise these facts, nor does it 
encourage him to base his choice on anecdotal information in the
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absence o f base rate data. But there is something new in the picture 
here, not much evident in the Christian Scientist’s choice between 
medicine and healing as the better risk for staying alive: the Jehovah’s 
W itness sees the choice as one for maximizing his hopes o f eternal 
rather than temporal life. Clearly, he does not want to die; otherwise, 
he would not consent to surgery at all. But he wants something else 
still more. He obeys the divine command because, he believes, to fail 
to do so might end his hopes o f salvation. Thus, although his pruden­
tial calculation is in structure just like the calculations made by the 
serpent handler, the Christian Scientist, and the member o f the Faith 
Assembly, its scope includes a wider set o f possible outcomes. This 
range of outcomes believed possible is expanded by the teachings of 
the church, which supplies not only the claim that there is such a 
condition as salvation, but a set o f conditions for attaining it, and it 
specifically identifies in its doctrines a particular act (accepting blood) 
which would preclude reaching this state at all.
To expand the range of possible outcomes a person foresees in this 
way has two associated consequences: it forces that person to reassess 
the disvalue he has assigned to the possible loss or adverse conse­
quences previously expected, and it forces him to reassess the value of 
the previously expected probable benefit or gain. Reassessment typi­
cally takes the form of diminution o f the extreme values assigned to 
the previous best and worst outcomes, though they remain possibili­
ties within the schema; for them are substituted distinctively religious 
outcomes, which now assume the most extreme values. These altered 
value rankings are so strongly bipolar and so extreme that the one, 
salvation, acquires complete priority over the other, damnation, and 
over all intermediate outcome states as well. Life and death become 
trifles in the face o f these new outcomes, so that they play only a sub­
sidiary role, if any at all, in risk-taking choices.
It is this double substitution in value rankings o f outcomes that is 
characteristic of religious recommitment and conversion, and it is the 
adoption and maintenance o f these value rankings that is central to 
much religious education and proselytism. (It is also this feature of 
reevaluation which distinguishes this type o f risk-budget alteration 
from simple coercion, discussed earlier; there, additional sanctions 
were added to the individual’s perceived range o f outcomes, but this 
did not produce reevaluation of the initial possible outcomes fore­
seen.) A reevaluation of outcomes of this sort would have quite evi­
dent effects on the risk-taking calculation: virtually any risk that 
might secure salvation would be worth it, whether it cost one’s life or 
anything else, provided only that failure in the risk would not pre­
clude future chances of achieving salvation after all. Similarly, virtu­
ally no risk o f damnation could conceivably be ventured, however 
attractive the intermediate gain.
But of course this starkly bipolar conception of an afterlife is too
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rigid and primitive for many more liberal, contemporary forms of 
religious faith; heaven and hell in a hereafter are not the outcomes 
envisioned by every religious consciousness, and many religious 
groups (or at least the more liberal elements within them), especially 
among mainstream Protestants and some Catholics, are discarding 
traditional notions of the afterlife. But this does not diminish the 
capacity o f these more liberal religious groups to alter their members’ 
evaluations of outcome states in risk-taking situations. For some 
modern groups, "heaven” and "hell” are taken to apply to this-world 
conditions, and there is no life after death; "heaven” and "hell” label 
states o f  human consciousness, but are equally strongly to be sought 
or avoided. These states are not to be confused with pleasure and pain 
or happiness and unhappiness. Borrowing Catholic terminology, they 
might best be called "beatitude” and "sin,” though a conception of 
them is by no means confined to Catholicism. They are distinctively 
religious conditions, though they may on occasion coincide with posi­
tive and negative hedonic states. These more contemporary interpreta­
tions o f traditional afterlife notions exhibit a second way in which 
religious groups can alter evaluations of outcomes in risk-taking calcu­
lations: they can divert the individual’s assignment of maximal value 
from secular states of happiness, pleasure, or utility generally defined 
to the distinctively religious condition of this-world beatitude.
Now this might seem to be a merely terminological change, if the 
individual is simply to switch his risk-taking strategies from maximiz­
ing utility in the secular sense to achieving this-world beatitude: it is 
still the state he most strongly prefers. But while secular states o f plea­
sure or happiness are by and large identifiable both by the agent and, 
though less reliably, by external observers, it is the religious group 
and tradition behind it which stipulates what counts as beatitude. It is 
also the religious group which defines the conditions for identifying it. 
Thus, the religious group both promotes achieving the state and urges 
adherents to be willing to risk all to gain it, and yet at the same time 
identifies what that state is and provides instructions ("discipline” ) 
for how to attain it. For some strains o f Catholicism, for instance, 
this-world beatitude seems to be identified with "the beauty o f suffer­
ing”: what one should want most is to be like Christ and to feel the 
full measure of His sacrifice.42 In other strains of the same tradition, it 
is identified with humility, or with mystic transport, or with complete 
self-sacrificing charity. In still other traditions, particularly those 
influenced by eastern religions, the maximally valued state (often  
called "enlightenment” ) is stipulated as egolessness, detachment, or 
perhaps complete obedience to the Master. The range of this-world 
conditions which are identified as maximally valued possible out­
comes may vary widely from group to group, but we must notice that 
in each case it is the religious group and its tradition which identifies 
the condition and assigns it both its preeminent status in the believer’s
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values schema and its capacity to reevaluate or eclipse ordinary value 
rankings. It is in this way that a religious group alters the risk budgets 
and hence the risk behavior of its members, first by stipulating what 
sorts of outcomes they should be willing to risk death to attain, and 
then by urging them to take the risk.
If we look back at the three forms of intervention in high-risk deci­
sion making we have previously described, it is easy to see where the 
moral analysis gains a foothold. The Faith Assembly methods involve 
clear-cut coercion, at least on some occasions. The Holiness Church 
avoids coercion but fosters a kind of circumstantial manipulation 
resulting in impairment of decision-making capacities. And inasmuch 
as Christian Science practices involve providing only partial, mislead­
ing information wholly inadequate for the sort of choice to be made, 
they involve deception. Coercion, manipulation and deliberate 
impairment, and deception are all familiar themes in moral analysis. 
But risk encouragement by reevaluation of outcomes, as among the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, may prove a difficult matter to assess via ordi­
nary moral analysis. There are two principal reasons for this diffi­
culty. First, since encouraging risk taking in this way does not seem to 
involve coercion, deception, or impairment of the individual’s reason­
ing processes, at least not to the same conspicuous degree as in the 
three previous groups we have examined, it does not appear to violate 
the conditions o f autonomous choice. Secondly, the reevaluation o f  
values is a familiar, accepted strategy for behavioral change, and is 
characteristic o f many other enterprises: education, psychotherapy, 
moral training, discipline and criminal justice, and so on. In each o f  
these areas, reevaluation proceeds by persuading the individual that 
his old goals, aims, fears, objectives, and so on were unsophisticated, 
immoral, or foolish, and by encouraging him to accept new, better, 
healthier ones. These new goals then assume preeminent status, and as 
the older ones are completely eclipsed or recede into triviality the ree­
valuation is achieved.
Although reevaluation may make use o f a variety o f specific tech­
niques, moral objections to deliberate alteration o f an individual’s 
valuation o f outcomes, where it does not involve coercion, deception, 
or impairment o f reasoning processes, typically attach not to the fact 
or methods o f reevaluation but to the altered valuation itself. Regard­
less o f its methods, we object when an institution—say, a school— 
attempts to turn a humanitarian into a bigot, for instance, but are 
much less likely to object when a similar institution using similar 
methods seeks to reverse the process. By and large, we take the reeva­
luation to be a salutary one when it assigns greater importance to 
rationally defensible value rankings such as happiness over unhappi­
ness, pleasure over pain, beauty over ugliness, health over illness, and 
so forth, both for the agent and for those affected by his actions. 
However, as we’ve seen, in religious contexts like that o f the Jehovah’s
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Witnesses, the reevaluation can move outside the range o f rationally 
defensible value rankings to assign preeminent status to distinctively 
religious conditions.
It is this that makes it difficult to evaluate some forms o f risk taking 
in religion and to assess the means by which some religious groups 
elicit such behavior. The sort o f altering of risk budgets by reevalua­
tion o f outcomes which characterizes Jehovah’s Witness practice 
should, presumably, be critiqued by assessing the actual moral value 
of the outcomes which come to be assigned highest rank in the indi­
vidual’s new evaluative scheme. But o f course it is not possible to 
supply morally objective, non-faith-based assessments o f these out­
comes, nor indeed objective, non-faith-based evidence for the reality 
or attainability of such outcomes, since they are distinctively religious 
conditions. The Jehovah’s W itness may be quite willing to risk death 
by refusing blood transfusions in order to attain salvation, but he has 
only faith-based "evidence” that there is such a thing as salvation or 
that keeping the commandment to avoid blood will be instrumental in 
attaining it. Similarly, the traditional Catholic who seeks beatitude in 
suffering has only faith-based evidence, supplied by the doctrines or 
teachings o f his church, to assure him o f the intrinsic superiority o f  
this condition over pleasure, happiness, or other secular states. N on­
believers will o f course be quite sceptical o f both such claims, and 
hence quite ready to say that these (erroneously) expected outcomes 
do not warrant the risks made in their names. Consequently, these 
sceptics will further argue, the institutional church which promotes 
risk taking in order to achieve these outcomes has no warrant for con­
trolling the behavior o f its adherents in this way. It may be one thing 
to hold or even teach beliefs of this sort. But it is quite another, the 
sceptics will add, to encourage or require persons to make high-risk 
personal decisions based on these beliefs, especially when it may cost 
them their lives. Where religious risk taking is elicited by reevaluation 
of outcome states in a way that deviates from rationally defensible 
rankings of outcomes, there is in principle no rationally defensible 
way o f providing moral justification for such practices, since we eval­
uate such practices on the basis o f outcome values but these religious 
outcomes cannot themselves be assessed. Thus risk encouragement by 
reevaluation cannot be attacked in the direct way that risk encour­
agement can be attacked when it proceeds by coercion, impairment, 
or deception, but it cannot be granted a clean bill o f ethical health 
either.
It is now also possible to see why it is often difficult, in the sorts of 
religious situations we are concerned with here, to distinguish 
between decisions under risk and those under uncertainty. In many or 
most o f these decision situations, the individual has very little, if any, 
knowledge of the actual probabilities o f the outcomes he can foresee; 
objectively speaking, his decision is made under uncertainty. But in
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most cases his religious group supplies him both with a general con­
ception of the likelihood of the various outcomes and a conception of  
what the range of possible outcomes is, though these conceptions are 
likely to be conveyed by trading on hopes, conveying promises, sup­
plying assurances, discounting counterevidence, and so on. Signifi­
cantly, the religious group typically supplies him with a conception 
that the probabilities are very strongly in his favor ("Since Jesus loves 
you, mere serpents cannot harm you.” ), though he has little or no 
objective evidence that this is so. Thus the individual believes he 
knows the probabilities o f the possible outcomes, and hence subjec­
tively speaking makes his choice as a decision under risk, though to an 
external view it is a decision made under uncertainty o f the most 
complete sort.
The Doctrinal Status of Risk Taking
To show that risk-taking religious conduct occurs in various forms 
and with various degrees o f risk in various religious groups is not yet 
to reach a normative conclusion. W e cannot simply assume that the 
making o f decisions in which one risks death is wrong, nor can we 
simply assume that there is something wrong with the various mecha­
nisms which religious groups employ to influence people in making 
these decisions—however extreme the risks, however manipulative 
the manner of encouraging them, and however severe their conse­
quences both for the risktaker and for other persons. These are the 
features that the examination of religious practices from the vantage 
point o f professional ethics exposes for us, but simply to identify 
these features is not yet to establish they are morally intolerable. After 
all, such conduct is governed not only by moral considerations, but 
also by the doctrines, teachings, and authoritative pronouncements of 
these specific religious groups.
Elsewhere,431 have developed a typology which distinguishes var­
ious levels o f doctrinal assertions with respect to the ethical dilemmas 
involved. This typology recognizes four distinct levels or orders of 
doctrinal assertions: 0-order or base-level doctrines, the fundamental 
imperatives of a group (often though not always stated in scriptural 
texts); first-order doctrines or teachings, which stipulate ways o f put­
ting the basic imperatives into practice but which in doing so charac­
teristically generate new moral problems; second-order doctrines or 
teachings, which establish a position attempting to resolve the ethical 
problems presented by first-order doctrines; and third-order doctrines 
or teachings which function as excuses for residual moral problems. 
This typology provides a basis for distinguishing the more fundamen­
tal religious imperatives o f a group from dictates which, though they 
may have achieved similar doctrinal status, exhibit later historical or 
theoretical development within a tradition and are best viewed as
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"answers” to and "excuses” for the moral problems posed by the 
fundamental imperatives and the ways they are put into practice. 
Because o f their derivative status, whatever doctrinal position they 
may enjoy, we treat them as initially more vulnerable to ethical cri­
tique than the basic imperatives of the tradition within which they 
arise.
If we survey the huge variety o f risk-taking practices evident among 
various Christian and Christian-influenced groups, we may use this 
model to differentiate among those risk-taking dictates which are 
more vulnerable and those which are less vulnerable to ethical cri­
tique. O f course, since the risk-taking practices we have described do 
not form a coherent, unified, single tradition, but occur in a spectrum 
of quite different denominations and sects with quite different histo­
ries, we must expect that application o f this model will not be com­
pletely tidy, nor uniform across these groups; nevertheless, it is possi­
ble to identify doctrines, directives and other authoritative 
pronouncements at all four levels.
This identification is most difficult at the 0-order, base level, since 
most Christian groups do not point to a single, explicit statement o f a 
risk-taking command in their scriptural texts in the same way that 
they point, for instance, to scriptural commandments to confess. 
There are o f course suggestive Biblical passages: the Parable o f the 
Talents, for instance, might be interpreted to commend those servants 
who took risks by investing the money with which they were 
entrusted, but condemn the servant who took the safe but unproduc­
tive course o f  burying his talents in the field. Yet we hardly wish to 
interpret such stories here, nor is it clear how this one is to be 
extended beyond financial investment, and in any case we could 
hardly suppose that such stories yield a clear, fundamental, unmistak­
able imperative. Nevertheless, even in the absence o f explicit Biblical 
texts stipulating the taking o f risks, it is fair to characterize Christian­
ity, with its history o f heroism, persecution, and voluntary martyr­
dom, as a religion o f personal commitment and sacrifice: it is a reli­
gion in which one must be fully committed and "risk one’s all” for 
God. As one contemporary fundamentalist writer portrays the charac­
teristic expression o f this commitment, "I’d risk anything for the 
Lord. My whole life is a risk for Jesus.” O f course, Christianity also 
offers comforts, including assurances o f divine benevolence and of 
eventual personal salvation, but these comforts are available only to 
those who are willing to risk themselves for the faith. Christianity, at 
least in its earlier forms, is not simply a religion of gradual, confident, 
relatively automatic self-development and unfolding, but a religion in 
which one’s future is always at stake: one is dared, so to speak, to put 
one’s faith in God, even when doing so will invite hardship, sacrifice, 
penalty, or death from a persecuting state. This feature of Christianity 
is particularly evident when it is compared with, say, Hinduism,
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Buddhism, or other eastern traditions.
If this central challenge to risk oneself in religious commitment 
constitutes the fundamental imperative underlying religious risk 
taking—that is, the making of high-risk decisions by opting for taking 
the risk—we shall expect the emergence of first-order doctrines stipu­
lating how one is to take this risk. Here we observe two divergent 
developments, developments which become increasingly distinct in 
later, post-Reformation periods of Christian history. In some groups, 
teachings emerge which interpret risks as a matter of faith or belief, 
and do not promote physical risks to health or life at all: it is coming 
to believe certain things that, in these traditions, constitutes the risk 
one must take for God. Risk lies in the "leap of faith,” not in the 
danger of bodily harm. This tendency, to treat the risks o f religious 
commitment as wholly mental, emotional, or spiritual, is characteris­
tic o f the Protestant tradition and o f some recent contemplative, east­
ern influenced Christian groups as well. Catholicism, with its tradi­
tional emphasis on fasting, mortifications o f the flesh, celibacy, 
pilgrimage, crusade, and martyrdom, has not always interpreted the 
risks of religious commitment in a wholly mentalized way, though 
contemporary Catholicism—except perhaps in its monastic communi­
ties, political activist groups, and such organizations as Opus Dei— 
may now much more closely resemble Protestant practice.
At the other extreme from a wholly mentalized conception o f risk 
which governs first-order mandates, the groups we have been examin­
ing here understand the risks which religious commitment poses as 
primarily physical ones, though o f course the distinction is not sharp 
and psychological risks may be intertwined with these. No doubt 
many members o f groups which construe risk as largely mental would 
say that they are prepared to risk their lives and physical selves as 
well, should the occasion demand it; but they do not belong to groups 
which have adopted high-risk behaviors as practices o f the group. It is 
this latter feature which is central to the groups we are considering 
here. Thus the crucial distinction at this first level o f doctrinal devel­
opment concerns institutionalized risk-taking practices stipulating 
how the fundamental imperative is to be honored: are they institu­
tionalized primarily as mental or as physical risks? In turn, the institu­
tionalization of risk-taking practices as involving physical risk brings 
with it a set o f new, explicitly ethical problems. (The institutionaliza­
tion o f practices involving mental risk may well generate similar prob­
lems, but for econom y’s sake they remain outside our scope.)
These schematic claims raise a problem of relativism: how can we 
reliably identify O-level imperatives? The historical account given here 
of the general relationship between the fundamental Christian impera­
tive to risk one’s all and derivative, upper-order practices interpreting 
these as mental or physical risks remains, I think, an accurate one; yet 
the four groups discussed here do not seem to fit this model very
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well. This might seem to undermine our typology, but I think it does 
not. The reason these groups do not seem to fit the typology is that 
they are not broadly representative o f the full scope o f developed 
practice we might expect to find associated with this fundamental 
imperative. Were we to include the practices o f Catholic and main­
stream Protestant groups in our discussion of risk, a much broader 
range o f the spectrum would be included; these are the groups that 
interpret risk taking, as we said, in a way that is primarily mentalized. 
Furthermore, some possibilities for interpreting risk-taking in a pnysi- 
calized way are simply not represented by extant groups at all, or per­
haps only by groups about whose doctrinal claims and associated 
practices we know comparatively little: we might find an example in 
the Penitentes o f the U.S. southwest, who practice ritual self­
crucifixion. W e have not chosen a range o f groups to represent the 
broadest variety o f possibilities for expression of a fundamental 
imperative well-distributed across a spectrum, but rather groups 
which exhibit similarities and differences within a much tighter range.
O f the groups discussed here, Christian Science fits most nearly 
into the broad category o f groups which honor an underlying, funda­
mental Christian imperative to risk oneself for God, though I think 
the Scientist would understand this to be a mental risk rather than a 
physical one: the believer’s risk involves shedding one’s materialist 
conception o f the world in favor o f a spiritualized view, and relying 
on healing rather than traditional medicine is simply a consequence of 
that altered view. In contrast, Jehovah’s Witnesses and the serpent- 
handing groups function in a way characteristic of fundamentalist 
groups: they take as 0-level a specific Biblical passage, literally inter­
preted and, they claim, rigorously obeyed.
Nevertheless, even for the fundamentalist groups, we can differen­
tiate upper-order, developed practices from the basic 0-level doc­
trines, even though the groups claim to be observing the scriptures 
perfectly faithfully. O f course, this is always a somewhat Procrustean 
exercise, since sensitive identification of a group’s teachings and prac­
tices requires sustained, detailed examination, and they do not always 
fit neatly into a tidy schema. Roughly, however, we can suggest that 
while for the serpent-handling groups M ark 16 is clearly the 0-level 
imperative, their first-order, developed practices center around the 
handling of serpents at religious services (about which Mark 16 says 
nothing). This, o f course, involves handling serpents in an identifiable 
location, the church; doing so in the presence o f observers; doing so 
on a more or less predictable, scheduled basis; and so on. The com­
mandment to handle serpents is put into practice by handling serpents 
at religious services, though it could o f course be done in other ways 
(e.g., solo, in the woods, only when one comes upon a snake). But the 
developed first-order practice o f handling serpents at these prayer 
meetings poses very obvious moral problems, among them those o f
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voluntariness and of danger to participants and observers. To 
"answer” these moral problems, second-order doctrines and practices 
emerge: those recognizing the distinctive condition of "annointment” 
and holding that it is prerequisite for handling snakes; those discou­
raging criticism o f churchmembers who do not handle snakes, those 
precluding offering snakes to visitors or to children, and so on. These 
are all ways of minimizing the physical and emotional damage the 
practice can create.
For Jehovah’s Witnesses, we can also identify the 0-level impera­
tives the group observes by inspecting its teachings: Genesis 9:4 and 
similar passages are those relevant here. This group’s developed prac­
tices are those which involve interpreting these Biblical passages as 
applying to blood transfusions (which, needless to say, are not explic­
itly mentioned in the Bible) and the structures o f religious education 
and reinforcement which promote this interpretive teaching. Here, 
obviously, it may be difficult to distinguish the development o f a 
practice from the development o f an interpretation; but in all groups, 
the development o f a practice goes hand in hand with the emergence 
of a doctrinal interpretation. The distinctive nature o f the Jehovah’s 
W itness interpretation-and-practice based on Genesis 9:4 and other 
texts can be more clearly seen by contrasting it with that of Judaism, 
where the same texts prohibiting eating or drinking blood are inter­
preted as dietary laws, and develop together with an extensive code o f 
kosher slaughtering, food preparation, and food serving.
In all the sorts o f cases we’ve examined, some risks eventuate badly: 
some persons who take these physical risks suffer serious damage to 
their health, and some of them die. The typological model we are 
employing predicts the emergence of a further level of doctrinal, 
quasi-doctrinal, or authoritative claim, which we’ve called third-order 
doctrine, serving to provide "excuses” for the residual moral prob­
lems which the practices in question generate. For instance, when a 
Christian Scientist practicing his beliefs by relying on healing refuses 
conventional medical treatment and dies, some account consistent 
both with the basic doctrinal imperative and the first- and second- 
order teachings is needed to explain or justify this negative outcome. 
Similarly, since serpent handlers act to honor M ark 16's assertion that 
"they will pick up serpents, and if they drink any deadly thing, it will 
not hurt them,” the group’s continued acceptance o f the basic reli­
gious imperative depends in part on providing a doctrinally acceptable 
account o f how snakebites and snakebite fatalities can occur—that is, 
an excuse for the negative outcome resulting from the risks a person 
takes in relying on the scriptural assurance that no harm will come 
from handling snakes.
These third-order teachings or "excuses” for failed risks are quite 
easy to identify, though they are not always encoded in official doc­
trine. When a Christian Scientist who refuses medical treatment and
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relies on prayer worsens or dies, the most frequent explanation, as 
observed earlier, is that he failed to pray adequately and hence failed 
to achieve the proper understanding o f the nature o f disease. Sim­
ilarly, the Faith Assembly member who dies after refusing treatment is 
said to have lacked faith in Jesus’ power to heal—an accusation 
Hobart Freeman even extended to those who wore automobile seat 
belts. The serpent handler who is bitten is sometimes said to have 
failed to be sure he was genuinely annointed before taking up the 
snakes: for instance, in an informative cautionary tale circulated 
among serpent handlers, the story is told o f a woman who planned to 
display her powers to handle snakes at a prayer meeting the following 
Sunday. Indeed, she kept a snake in a jar for this very purpose. But 
when she took out the snake at the announced time she was bitten 
and died—clearly, so the tale holds, because she had failed to wait for 
the appropriate annointing by God. Not long before receiving a bite 
on the toe, Reverend Clyde Ricker o f Hot Springs, North Carolina, 
offered a slightly different explanation:
I’d say that if I get bit, and I swell up, that’s not a sign 
that I denied the faith, or that I wasn’t annointed...God 
was just using me to prove to somebody that the serpents 
have teeth, and to show what snakes can do to you.44
N ot only is it easy to identify these third-order teachings or 
"excuses” for the negative outcomes that a group’s risk-taking practi­
ces have brought about, but it is easy to see a common feature of 
them: they explain the negative outcome as a result o f a failure on the 
part o f the individual harmed. This is true in the Faith Assembly, the 
Holiness Church, and Christian Science, and even Clyde Ricker’s 
attempt to explain the bite on his toe as "God using me to prove that 
serpents have teeth” is preceded by an attempt to defuse the usual 
institutional explanations—that he denied the faith, or wasn’t 
annointed. Thus, in examining the "excuses” various groups encode 
in their doctrines, we can begin by considering whether excuses which 
lay the blame for unsuccessful risk taking at the feet o f the risktaker 
are themselves morally defensible, or whether a defensible excuse 
must be o f some other form.
In contrast, the Jehovah’s W itnesses appear to offer no excuse 
when a W itness refuses transfusion and dies. But notice that under 
the reevaluation which is characteristic o f Jehovah’s W itness practice, 
there is nothing to excuse. The faithful W itness who dies because he 
refuses blood nevertheless (according to the teachings o f the group) 
achieves salvation, even if he loses his life. But achieving salvation is, 
under the reevaluation, the maximally valued outcome the choice 
could yield, whereas losing one’s life under this reevaluation assumes 
much lesser importance. Consequently, for the devout, the death need 
not be excused.
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In looking at the practices of our four specimen groups, it has been 
tempting to draw the immediate conclusion that these practices can­
not be morally defended—and, indeed, that they should be 
denounced on moral grounds. After all, we have already established 
that the developed practices and teachings o f religious groups, as dis­
tinct from the fundamental imperatives, are vulnerable to ethical cri­
tique, and when we now look at these practices, we see that they 
involve clear abuses o f identifiable moral principle: coercion, impair­
ment of rational capacities, and deception. But to identify these 
apparent moral abuses is not to establish that they are abuses in reli­
gious contexts; we have only seen them this way because we instinc­
tively appeal to principles familiar in secular life, though these princi­
ples may have no purchase in religious contexts. Even though we have 
established that certain religious doctrines and practices are indeed 
open to ethical critique, we cannot simply assume that the principles 
presupposed by this catalogue o f apparent abuses are applicable here.
O f the moral principles these apparent abuses appear to violate, 
that of autonomy is central, the one highlighted by our strategy of 
considering issues in religious risk taking in light o f professional 
ethics’ concept o f informed consent. The principle of autonomy, 
received in both its Kantian form and in the utilitarian version 
defended by John Stuart Mill, is not itself contested in either ordinary 
or professional ethics, though there are of course continuing vigorous 
debates about how it should be interpreted, about the degree to which 
individuals are capable of genuine autonomy, and about when, if ever, 
the principle may be overridden. This principle has been particularly 
vigorously applied in contemporary professional ethics; here too, dis­
agreement virtually exclusively concerns the conditions under which 
paternalistic or harm-based exceptions to this principle are legitimate, 
and there are no real challenges to the principle o f autonomy itself.
Though they are often explicated within professional ethics in more 
elaborate ways, the conditions for autonomous choice involve three 
criteria:
1) the decision must be uncoerced;
2 ) the decision must be rationally unimpaired; and
3) the decision must be adequately informed.
As we have seen, these are precisely the conditions which the prac­
tices of these groups violate. The Faith Assembly, at least on some 
occasions, coerces its members into refusing medical treatment. The 
Holiness Church serpent-handling groups encourage making poten­
tially fatal decisions about handling snakes under extreme emotional 
impairment, calling that condition an "annointment” for taking the 
risk. Christian Science provides selective, anecdotal information only, 
without base or failure rates, in a way which is inevitably deceptive in
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influencing a high-risk choice. Nor is it apparent that these interferen­
ces in autonomous choice can be excused on grounds o f risks to third 
parties or compelling paternalist reasons. Consequently, since these 
practices are vulnerable to ethical critique and the infractions o f the 
principle o f  autonomy are so clear, it would seem that moral conclu­
sions could readily be drawn.
But I do not think this is so. Our apparatus for critiquing religious 
practice is not yet complete, and because o f this, the principle of 
autonomy cannot be directly employed. As we said, the upper-level 
doctrines and practices are candidates for critique; but we have yet to 
establish on what basis the critique can be made. To try to condemn 
these practices for violating the conditions o f autonomous choice 
involves an unwarranted leap in ethical evaluation, even though these 
criteria are well established in both professional and ordinary ethics.
It is a leap we can make— and then only in limited ways—only after 
we have supplemented our initial typology with the appropriate criti­
cal principle.
The principle to which we shall appeal, the fiduciary principle, is a 
distinct moral principle, not reducible either to that o f autonomy or 
to those of nonmaleficence and beneficence. Most explicitly articu­
lated in law, it is vaguely recognized in various forms in all o f the secu­
lar professions. The fiduciary principle serves to identify the obliga­
tions o f the professional vis-a-vis the client in professional contexts, 
and is usually thought to be limited to these contexts and to a few dis­
tinctive interpersonal relationships; it is not usually said to be appli­
cable across the board in ordinary morality.
To employ a principle adopted from professional ethics to examine 
organized religion is not to presuppose that religious functionaries are 
all professionals in the fullest sense. Clergy o f the mainstream denom­
inations have traditionally been regarded in this way, though of course 
cult leaders, evangelists, faith healers, gurus, and the like have not.
But while the fiduciary principle has been developed in professional 
contexts, its scope, as we will see, is broader, and it provides the cru­
cial distinction we require in assessing religious practice.
The fiduciary principle, which applies to all the aspects of 
professional-client interaction, regulates these by stipulating that it 
must be possible for the client to trust the professional in the course 
o f this interaction, even though the professionals own interests may 
conflict with those o f the client. Put another way, the fiduciary prin­
ciple prohibits the professional from "taking advantage o f ’ the 
client—that is, violating the client’s rights or harming his interests—in 
the course o f the professional relationship, though of course the pro­
fessional’s superior status, power, and knowledge would make it easy 
for him to do so. For example, the lawyer has fiduciary duties to the 
client; this means that the lawyer must use his professional skills to 
advance the client’s interests, or at the least not to harm them. Sim-
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ilarly, the trustee, as fiduciary to the beneficiary o f a trust fund, must 
refrain from usurping the beneficiary’s interests in the fund, just as 
the director of a corporation must refrain from promoting his own 
interests at the expense o f the corporation’s. The fiduciary principle 
may seem to be similar to the more general principle o f nonmalefi­
cence, but it has specific application to professional-client relationship 
and the characteristic imbalance o f power this relationship exhibits. It 
is broader in scope than the comparatively narrow principle of auto­
nomy; it requires the professional not only to respect autonomous 
choices on the part o f the client and to protect the client’s capacity for 
autonomous choice, but also to ensure (and this does not rule out 
paternalistic intervention) that the client’s interests are served. Thus 
the principle is a complex one, with conditions often in tension 
between autonomist and paternalist demands, but one which makes 
clear that the professional’s primary obligation is to the client, rather 
than to his or her own interests, to the institution, or to other parties 
who might be involved. As Charles Fried puts it, the fiduciary "owes 
a duty of strict and unreserved loyalty to his client.”45
Inasmuch as the fiduciary principle has autonomist components, 
the three conditions for the protection of autonomous choice identi­
fied above— noncoercedness, freedom from rational impairment, and 
adequate informedness—can all be derived from it, though o f course 
in some circumstances they may be in tension with paternalist com­
ponents o f the principle. In professional areas such as medicine and 
law, these three conditions serve to protect the client from the profes­
sional in very specific ways. The client, it is assumed, consults the 
professional in order to advance his own aims and interests, and the 
protection he needs is protection from professional dishonesty, 
manipulation, or greed which might undermine them. For instance, 
when the patient consults the doctor for help in curing his illness, he 
finds himself in an unequal, vulnerable position in this relationship 
(he is, after all, both sick and untrained in medicine), and must rely 
on the physician’s obligations as fiduciary to keep from being made 
still worse off—and specifically from being made still worse off with 
respect to his health. The legal client consults the attorney for help in 
protecting his rights, and similarly relies on the attorney’s fiduciary 
obligation to him, for since the attorney is far more skilled in the law 
than he, the attorney could easily jeopardize those rights. To be sure, 
professionals are also often in a position to jeopardize other interests 
of the client (both doctors and lawyers, for instance, are easily able to 
threaten a patient’s or client’s financial wellbeing), but it is with 
respect to that specific interest or set o f interests the client has con­
sulted the professional in order to promote that the fiduciary princi­
ple most directly applies.
Given this, we may now notice that, like other professionals, the 
religious "professional,” whether minister, priest, rabbi, parson,
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evangelist, faith healer, guru, or leader in a cult, is also in a position to 
he able to make the individuals within his group either better or 
worse off. He can affect their financial, social, or other peripheral 
interests; but he can also affect either positively or negatively that spe­
cific aim or interest for which they come to him in the first place, and 
it is this fact which initially supports the appeal to the fiduciary prin­
ciple we are making here. What the fiduciary principle requires is that 
the priest and the preacher not treat those who come to them as prey, 
even in the most subtle ways, or use them to serve their own self­
interested or other ends.
To construe the relationship between religious professional and 
member o f the religious group in this way invites us then to identify 
precisely what it is that the religious believer comes to the religious 
professional for, that is, what interests o f his own he hopes to serve 
by approaching the religious professional, and although this may be 
very difficult to do in any specific case, we may nevertheless be able 
to venture certain general observations. O f course, we need not sup­
pose that the reasons for which religious believers make use o f the 
services of religious professionals are anywhere nearly as uniform as 
those of patients consulting doctors or clients seeing lawyers, and 
individuals may go to church or see their ministers or priests for rea­
sons ranging from relieving anxiety, coping with fear, dealing with 
grief, preserving a marriage, curbing aggressive or suicidal impulses, 
restoring health, maintaining social standing, studying a tradition, or 
enhancing and deepening their faith. But despite this enormous range 
of purposes for which people may make use of religious services, we 
can still identify comparatively clear aspects of the relationship 
between religious professionals and the believers or adherents of the 
group which allow us to make the further distinction required.
Consider, for instance, the reasons for which the Christian Scientist 
or a member o f the Faith Assembly has contact with the leaders of his 
group, as contrasted with the reasons for which, say, a member of a 
serpent-handling group might do so. The Christian Scientist calls a 
practitioner when he is ill, and he does so for help in restoring his 
health. Similarly, the member o f the Faith Assembly rejects medicine 
and relies on Jesus in order to get well, but he also acts to retain his 
membership and avoid humiliation by the group. The serpent 
handler, on the other hand, attends a prayer meeting and handles ser­
pents in order to satisfy the injunction he believes M ark  16 states; it is 
less evident that there is some particular external objective that he 
wishes to achieve. Then again, the Jehovah’s Witness appears to 
refuse blood in order to satisfy the Biblical commandment much as 
the serpent handler does, but does so in order not to jeopardize his 
chances of salvation.
O f course, identifying reasons for which persons engage in religion 
is a murky business at best, and a full psychological explanation of
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these various behaviors may be much more complex than we can 
sketch here. Nevertheless, we can still perceive the rather strikingly 
different degrees o f rational prudence, that is, pursuit o f self-interest, 
exhibited in the various cases. The Christian Scientist seeks to get 
well, just as any ordinary patient seeing any ordinary doctor does; in 
doing so, he acts to promote one among his interests, namely health. 
To be sure, he does not call his condition "illness,” nor recognize his 
symptoms as those of "disease,” and he does not understand the end 
state he seeks as "cure,” but rather a "demonstration” o f the truth o f  
the principles o f Christian Science. Indeed, he rejects the entire causal 
metaphysics of medicine. Nevertheless, he accepts, and his church 
promotes, a variety of external similarities, many dating from the ear­
liest period o f the church,46 which reinforce the claim that what he 
seeks is what any ordinary patient does: help in regaining his health. 
For instance, he calls the practitioner only when he has discomforting 
symptoms (whether or not he views these as symptoms o f disease). He 
can find the practitioner by looking in the Yellow Pages. He makes an 
appointment; he pays for the practitioner’s services at rates roughly 
comparable to those o f a physician; and, in some states (Massachu­
setts, for instance) Blue Cross foots the bill. To put it another way, 
Christian Science functions as an alternative health-care system, 
though it denies medicine’s metaphysics and makes no use of medical 
techniques, and we can easily identify that professional institution to 
which Christian Science promotes itself as an alternative. The serpent 
handler, in contrast, does not so clearly seem to seek to advance his 
interests in risking his life, but seems to act rather to obey the injunc­
tion he believes. At least, there seem to be no external similarities 
promoted by his group which reinforce the claim that in handling 
snakes he seeks to promote the same sorts o f aims or interests that 
clients o f other professionals do, and we cannot readily identify any 
professional institution which promotes the sorts o f aims or interests 
that serpent handlers satisfy in risking their lives as they do. Serpent 
handling, as we might say, is not an alternative anything; it is simply a 
practice o f the group.
Observing these differences may also allow us to see why the fidu­
ciary principle, while vaguely asserted in the secular professions, is 
not much discussed there, and why in contrast it should be o f particu­
lar interest in the religious sphere. The fiduciary principle prohibits 
the professional from violating moral principles in such a way as to 
undermine the aims or interests o f the client who makes use o f the 
professional’s services in order to protect or advance these aims or 
interests. But in medicine and law, as in the other secular professions, 
this covers the entire range o f cases: patients and legal clients use the 
services o f doctors and lawyers primarily in order to protect and 
advance their own aims or interests, or those of organizations and 
causes with which they identify, and generally not for any other rea­
son. They come to lawyers and doctors in order to protect their 
rights, broadly construed, or in order to get well. Since virtually all 
the activities in which the professional engages are initiated by this 
intention on the part o f the client, there is nothing in these areas of  
professional practice which the fiduciary principle might distinguish 
from them. (To be sure, some clients do not voluntarily consult pro­
fessionals on their own, but are so to speak delivered to them: the 
unconscious emergency patient, the impoverished defendant in the 
criminal justice system; but even in such circumstances the fiduciary 
principle by extension still applies.) O f course, on some occasions a 
client might consult a professional for purposes that do not appear to 
serve his own self-interests— say, when a person consults a doctor in 
order to donate a kidney to someone else—but even here the patient 
does so with the aim o f protecting his own interests as well. He does 
not after all ask the doctor to remove the kidney without regard for 
the health o f the donor; his own interests are to be protected as far as 
possible even in altruistic donation.
If, then, the fiduciary principle is not particularly conspicuous in 
the secular professions, largely because it covers virtually all the avail­
able cases, it nevertheless will play a central role in sorting out those 
cases in religion to which ordinary moral norms apply and those in 
which they do not. It provides a criterion for critiquing those upper- 
level practices and doctrines we have already distinguished from 0- 
level imperatives, by telling us under what circumstances these upper- 
level practices and doctrines can actually be critiqued with the moral 
principles available in professional and ordinary ethics, i.e., such prin­
ciples as autonomy, nonmaleficence, and beneficence. It thus func­
tions as a second general principle, complementing our working 
typology, developed earlier, which shall govern the application of  
ordinary moral norms to religious practices. The fiduciary principle 
does not in itself aid us in sorting out conflicts and tensions between 
the demands o f autonomy, nonmaleficence, and beneficence, either in 
general or in specific cases like those o f Faith Assembly members or 
Marian Guinn; this is work for the applied professional ethicist con­
cerned with organized religion, the "ecclesioethicist,” to do. But the 
principle does tell us when the ecclesioethicist can get to work, by tell­
ing us in what circumstances the basic moral principles can be ap­
plied. Specifically, the principle holds that the developed practices, 
doctrines, methods, and teachings employed by religious professionals 
or their religious organizations must meet secular moral criteria wher­
ever the individual participates in these practices in order to advance 
his own aims or interests. Depending on the specific aims and inter­
ests the individual brings to this interaction, different specific moral 
principles will be particularly relevant. To use the example developed 
here, where the aims and interests o f the individual are met with deve­
loped doctrines and practices promoting high-risk decision making,
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these practices are to be assessed particularly under the principle of 
autonomy. This, o f course, is what we’ve instinctively already been 
doing, and we’ve found that under this principle, most o f the practi­
ces we’ve examined are morally indefensible.
To put the fiduciary principle in another way, we may say that the 
fact that the religious professional is religious does not exempt him 
from treating his clients in ways which are morally required in the 
secular professions wherever the client approaches him for the same 
sorts o f self-interest-serving purposes as he would approach a secular 
professional. If the Christian Scientist seeks help from a Christian 
Scientist practitioner in order to get well, then he is entitled to the same 
freedom from coercion, from impairment, and to the same adequate 
information to which an ordinary medical patient would be entitled in 
seeking to get well. If he approaches the practitioner instead as a mat­
ter o f expressing and deepening his faith—as many devout Christian 
Scientists clearly do—then it is not so clear that these constraints 
apply. Many Christian Scientists conceive of healing not as an alterna­
tive medical system at all, but simply as part o f the process o f prayer 
and the effort to achieve a certain spiritual condition—of which a side 
effect, though not the central purpose, may be the restoration o f  
health.47
Now it may seem that the religious organization, or the religious 
professional within it, can have no such fiduciary obligation, inas­
much as neither the professional nor the organization has control over 
the reasons for which the individual approaches. But o f course this is 
not so, for the way in which a religious organization, and conse­
quently its officials, are approached is very much a function o f the 
way in which it announces or advertises itself. This is an interactive 
process between the organization and the individuals who approach it, 
a process not much remarked upon in the secular professions, since 
most secular professions announce themselves in quite uniform ways, 
but a process o f tremendous variability in religion. Christian Science, 
for instance, announces and promotes itself as an alternative healing 
system by the very fact of, among many other things, distributing tes­
timonials which recount favorable recoveries using Christian Science 
healing (even though these testimonials are described primarily as 
serving to give thanks to God), and asking Blue Cross to cover the 
services rendered. In response to the way in which Christian Science 
announces and promotes itself, prospective users of Christian Science 
approach it in kind, seeking to receive these services to further their 
aims and interests in getting well. At the same time, the fact that 
prospective users o f Christian Science healing, both members and 
prospective converts, seek to further their aims and interests in getting 
well leads the church and its officials to promote these services in this 
way. Similarly, for example, Scientology promotes itself as providing 
help in achieving psychological stability and growth, and in this sense
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functions as an alternative psychotherapeutic profession; but this 
stance is interactive with aims and purposes for which prospective 
users o f its services approach Scientology. W hen we talk about what a 
client comes to the professional for, we are saying as much about the 
professional and the background organization as we are about the 
client; hence, to phrase the fiduciary principle in terms of what the 
client seeks is also to identify specific professional and institutional 
postures. In religion, then, the fiduciary principle permits the applica­
tion o f standard ethical principles when adherents approach with self­
interested aims, and thus when the religious group and its officials 
announce themselves as available for adherents to do so.
O f course, it may be that virtually all religious invitation contains 
some appeal to self-interest. But insofar as a group makes such invita­
tion, under the interpretation of the fiduciary principle advanced here 
it is obligated to protect and promote the aims and self-interests to 
which this invitation is directed. The church that announces itself as 
able to satisfy certain interests of persons who are attracted to the 
church in this way thus opens itself to secular moral critique o f practi­
ces and doctrines it employs in satisfying these interests. Curiously, 
this distinction is reflected in a somewhat crude way in the growing 
area of clergy malpractice insurance: malpractice insurance is available 
in approximately those areas in which clergy do what other profes­
sionals do, especially counseling, but not for practices much less 
directly related to the satisfaction of individual self-interests, such as 
the performance o f rites, the maintenance o f beliefs, the upholding o f  
orthodoxy, and so on. N ot all o f the upper-order doctrines o f a reli­
gious group will be susceptible to ethical critique; but many o f those 
which have been traditionally protected by the notion o f religious 
immunity will be seen to be clear targets for ethical examination, and 
can be assessed using the secular moral criteria developed within 
ordinary and professional ethics. To be sure, things are by no means 
as tidy as this distinction may make it sound; most groups give off 
mixed signals, and are approached for a mixed bag of reasons. Never­
theless, this untidiness in practice by no means undermines the signif­
icance o f the distinction in sorting out what can and cannot be 
critiqued.
Thus, we can now see that it has been appropriate after all to engage 
in the kind o f morally evaluative discussion we have of the practices 
of our specimen groups. At least in the cases o f the Faith Assembly, 
Christian Science, and Jehovah’s Witnesses, there is good reason to 
think that individuals consult religious professionals to promote their 
own interests, and that these groups promote their characteristic prac­
tices under a corresponding appeal to self-interest o f the members of 
the group. Christian Scientists choose prayer over medicine in order 
to get well, and the practice of resorting to prayer is promoted by the 
church as a way to achieve this end. Jehovah’s Witnesses refuse blood
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in order not to preclude salvation, and the practice of refusing blood 
is promoted by the church and its officials at least in part with this 
rationale. Members of the Faith Assembly submit to coercive mea- ' 
sures in refusing treatment in order to maintain their membership in 
the group. And if what the serpent handler seeks is the heightened 
sensory or emotional experience provided by the dangerous thrill o f 
handling snakes, then this too belongs under ordinary ethical scrutiny. 
After all, heightened sensory or emotional experience may be availa­
ble in other less life-threatening ways.
Applications of this criterion, based on the fiduciary principle, are 
not likely to be easy to make in practice. After all, the principle refers 
to the reasons for which persons use religious services, as induced by 
the religious organization and vice versa, and these reasons may be 
multifarious and obscure. In any given case or group o f cases, we 
would need to inquire into the purposes for which an individual or 
group of individuals consults a religious practitioner, and such inquiry 
may seem both unwieldy and quite unlikely to be reliable. People par­
ticipate in religious practices like confession, counseling, faith healing, 
and so on for an enormous variety o f reasons, including restoring 
their health, relieving their anxieties, preserving their marriages, 
increasing their security, dealing with grief, and so on. Indeed, a very 
large part of what leads the religious believer to approach the religious 
professional seems to involve the protection and advancement of 
interests like these, and a very large part o f the comforts that religious 
groups offer are directed towards interests like these. Self-interested 
religious behavior may be very difficult to distinguish from that which 
is not. But however cumbersome applications of the principle might 
be in practice, and consequently however poor a basis it might make 
for policy formation, it is an appropriate basis for distinguishing those 
religious activities and practices which are proper targets for ethical 
critique from those which are comparatively immune. It is also a 
proper basis for scrutinizing the way in which religious groups adver­
tise themselves and their services, both in securing continuing com­
mitment from their members and in proselytizing new ones. Perhaps 
in part because o f the difficulty o f distinguishing among kinds o f reli­
gious practice, our tendency in the past has been to let them all slip 
by, and to retreat to the traditional notion o f the immunity of reli­
gious matters generally from moral critique. But just as it would be 
indefensible to subject all religious doctrine and practice to ethical ; 
scrutiny where there is no warrant for doing so, it is indefensible to 
protect from scrutiny those religious practices which deserve it.
However, not all approach by individuals to religious "profession­
als” or organizations is made for reasons o f promoting self-interest.
To determine the obligations of the religious professional in any given 
case, we need to examine the reasons for which a specific person or 
group of persons seeks religious services; not all o f these may involve
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self-interest. Consider, for instance, the person who describes his rea­
sons for seeing his minister or going to church as wanting to "streng­
then my faith.” This seemingly central religious purpose bears close 
scrutiny, and it must be asked why or for what purpose the believer 
seeks this service. If, for instance, it is evident that the believer seeks 
to have his faith strengthened "so I can be sure I’ll go to heaven,” his 
motive sounds very much like the kind o f self-interest which other 
forms o f rational prudence display. Once it is assumed or believed 
that there is a heaven, then it is not so much a matter o f religion to 
want to get there; it is a matter o f rational prudence, particularly con­
sidering that the only available alternative under this belief system is 
hell. Consequently, even the apparently purely religious purpose of 
"strengthening one’s faith” in consulting a religious professional or 
participating in religious practices falls under the fiduciary principle 
just articulated. Hence the professional’s methods of providing these 
services, and the established church practices which support them, are 
subject to the same working moral criteria as other areas of profes­
sional ethics, at least if we assume that the religious professional is 
capable of either advancing or undermining the interests a person 
seeks to advance.
This conclusion does not entail, however, that the same local prin­
ciples or rules of professional ethics apply in religion as they do in 
medicine or law, for while the fiduciary principle may provide a basic 
moral standard for all areas o f professional practice, including organ­
ized religion, it may be that specific application of principles derived 
from it, as well as local rules such as confidentiality or truth telling, 
differs from one area of professional practice to another. Thus, prin­
ciples governing the protection o f autonomy in decision making 
under risk may differ somewhat from psychiatry to medicine to 
sports coaching to religion, but they must all satisfy the general fidu­
ciary requirement that the professional not take advantage of the 
client.
But while having one’s faith strengthened in order to get to heaven 
may not be a distinctively religious purpose for consulting a religious 
professional, we can imagine purposes which are. A person who 
initially expresses his desire for help in strengthening his faith might, 
in contrast, explain that he seeks this help because God is supremely 
worthy of worship and hence he wishes to be able to worship God 
more fully—regardless o f the impact this fuller worshipping might 
have on himself. This kind o f purpose in seeking assistance from a 
religious professional is not one in which the person puts his own 
self-interests in a position in which they are vulnerable to the profes­
sional’s influence, and consequently it is not one in which the usual 
strictures o f professional morality under the fiduciary principle apply. 
For instance, some Christian Scientists, as perhaps some Faith 
Assembly members and some Jehovah’s Witnesses, may observe their
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church’s teaching not in order to enhance their own health or secure 
their own salvation, but simply because, as they believe, it is the word 
of God. In these cases the methods o f the religious professional and of 
the group’s religious practices are not subject to the three criteria out­
lined above, and we have no immediate basis for saying that coercion, 
impairment o f rationality, deception, or fraud cannot be morally 
allowed. (This is not, of course, to say that they are justified.) How­
ever, these cases may be very, very few, and such people as rare as 
saints. If most religious behavior by most persons is really the pursuit 
of self-interest under a special set of metaphysical assumptions, then 
the "professionals” who are the purveyors and caretakers of these 
assumptions in the form of religious doctrine, teachings, and practices 
are obligated—as in any fiduciary relationship—to protect these per­
sons in that pursuit.
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